The current pace and scope of U.S. nuclear modernization is risking unprecedented strategic instability over the coming decades in a developing multipolar nuclear competition. The United States must make decisions regarding its nuclear posture to address the new reality of confronting two major nuclear adversaries. If the United States is going to maintain its current doctrine, there needs to be a dramatic acceleration and expansion of the recapitalization program to enable a larger force design. The only other viable path is gradually abandoning longstanding nuclear warfighting preferences and curtailing extended deterrence commitments.
The basis of the current U.S. nuclear posture and modernization program was agreed upon in 2010 in a categorically different global strategic environment. The Obama administration and Congress negotiated a bipartisan deal on further strategic force reductions with the ratification of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) in exchange for the recapitalization of the nuclear triad.1 Since then, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has emerged as a second peer adversary as it rapidly expands its nuclear arsenal and develops an operational triad.2 Meanwhile, the Russian Federation has essentially completed its nuclear modernization, developed novel delivery systems, withdrawn from the arms control regime, and engaged in repeated acts of armed aggression, culminating in the Russo-Ukrainian War.3 Although Washington will have some options available following the expiration of New START Treaty limits, the emergence of the Chinese threat alongside the legacy Russian threat will require a fundamental reassessment of the U.S. nuclear posture.4
Any significant change will necessitate a White House and Congress willing to devote substantial political capital to accelerate the recapitalization of the triad and the dilapidated nuclear enterprise administered by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).5 Without presidential leadership, it is highly unlikely that sufficient additional resources, persistent political accountability, and bureaucratic urgency can be marshaled to meaningfully accelerate or expand the program of record. Given the sluggish rate of change in large organizations like the Department of Defense and NNSA, and the inherent complexity of the recapitalization programs, the decisions made in the coming years will have an impact that lasts decades.
Without choosing to accelerate recapitalization and expand force structure, Washington will soon be committed to a future of greater risk acceptance. The diminishment of nuclear warfighting capabilities relative to growing adversary capabilities will weaken the credibility of U.S. security commitments.6 Finally, it is inconceivable in such a future that Washington will be able to engage in credible and beneficial arms control negotiations with Beijing and Moscow from a position of relative weakness. This paper explores the current strategic nuclear situation, threat, constraints, and options available to the United States.
Nuclear Refresher
The United States has gone an entire generation without having to seriously contemplate nuclear war. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the main nuclear concern in Washington was nuclear proliferation by rogue states and nuclear terrorism. After three decades of relative insignificance, the Russo-Ukrainian War and China’s nuclear buildup have brought nuclear deterrence back into relevance.7
Nuclear deterrence is ultimately as much an art as a science because it targets the mind of the adversary. The effectiveness of deterrence is considered by assessing capabilities, the physical means to inflict harm upon and minimize the harm of the opponent, and the will to use such capabilities.8 In the nuclear context, the capabilities are straightforward: the nuclear weapons themselves and the forces that employ them. While all nuclear powers naturally conceal aspects to greater or lesser degrees (such as total warhead numbers, deployed numbers, weapon yields, locations, targeting plans, employment thresholds, etc.), capabilities can at least be roughly assessed given the sheer size of the necessary infrastructure to build and maintain nuclear weapons. The will to use nuclear weapons is much more subjective. Public rhetoric, private diplomacy, military planning, exercising, force readiness, and shows of force can all demonstrate the will to employ nuclear weapons to an adversary, ally, or oneself, but it is ultimately a subjective assessment of human beings about the perceived costs against the desired benefits. The success of deterrence is thus unprovable since it is working when an adversary chooses not to do something.9
A critical aspect of nuclear warfighting is determining what to target. Establishing an intended target list and contingency plan can also have a deterrent effect because it might be perceived as demonstrating a more serious will to employ. There are two general doctrines for strategic nuclear targeting: countervalue and counterforce.10 These terms are purely academic and do not exist in any official documents, as in practice they inevitably overlap, but they offer some explanatory value. Countervalue is simply targeting that which the adversary most values. A country with a minimal deterrent of a few hundred nuclear weapons, such as pre-buildup China, is likely limited to countervalue targeting against the adversary’s leadership and large population centers.
In counterforce targeting, the opponent’s nuclear forces (and potentially conventional military forces) are the primary target, with the goal of minimizing their retaliatory potential by destroying as much of the opponent’s forces as possible before they can be used. The United States maintained more of a counterforce doctrine that primarily sought to destroy Soviet (and later Russian) strategic forces in the event of nuclear escalation. Political and military leadership would still be targeted and inevitably there would be significant civilian collateral damage, but the plan was to destroy the opponent’s ability to fight, not simply incur maximum civilian deaths.11 Counterforce also has the potential to minimize the damage received, although the awesome power of nuclear weapons generally ensures that mutually assured destruction (MAD) can be credibly assumed and likely precludes the potential for a debilitating first strike.12
The United States has consistently affirmed, such as in Nuclear Posture Reviews, that nuclear weapons are foundational to the national defense and “the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our Allies, and our partners.”13 If deterrence should fail, “the United States would seek to end any conflict at the lowest level of damage possible on the best achievable terms.”14
Dangers of the Present Nuclear Posture
The U.S. nuclear posture is increasingly strained in two ways: insufficient overall numbers and a lack of capabilities in the middle and lower end of the escalation ladder.15 The lack of numbers is a simple arithmetic problem: the modernization plan keeps its stockpile number constant, and the nuclear enterprise lacks any capacity to expand production for at least the next decade. Meanwhile, Russia can immediately begin expanding its arsenal if it were to abandon treaty limits and China is currently expanding its arsenal without any treaty constraints.16 Similarly, North Korea, Pakistan, and India are all growing their much-smaller arsenals, while the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to enrich uranium ever closer to weapon-grade levels.17
On the capabilities side, the United States has limited nuclear options between B61 gravity bombs delivered by tactical aviation and the main strategic force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and heavy bombers.18 The relatively newly developed W-76-2 Low Yield submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) provides a more prompt and survivable low-yield option than B61 gravity bombs, but it is limited in absolute numbers and adds risk to the SSBNs that are responsible for providing a secure second-strike.19 The planned reintroduction of a nuclear-armed, submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) will bolster Washington’s options on the lower-end of the escalation ladder given the greater size of the nuclear attack submarines (SSN) fleet, but is years away from deployment.20
The potential danger of the U.S. nuclear posture can be demonstrated in three of the most likely scenarios where the United States might be compelled to leverage its nuclear forces: defending NATO against Russian aggression, defending Taiwan against Chinese aggression, and defending South Korea against North Korean aggression. These scenarios can also happen concurrently, which would further strain Washington’s ability to respond. Even while engaging in brinkmanship—much less a nuclear exchange—with one adversary, the United States will ideally maintain sufficient nuclear forces to credibly deter all other adversaries. Soon, U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) could have too few assets to deter all adversaries simultaneously.21
As a larger percentage of the U.S. strategic force is necessary to deter growing Russian and Chinese strategic forces, it creates opportunities for adversaries to test American red lines, such as its extended deterrence commitments. Whether responding to saber-rattling or to tactical nuclear use, Washington will be compelled to decide how much of its nuclear capabilities it is willing to risk deterring limited aggression without compromising its posture against other potential adversaries. This will only magnify American allies’ longstanding uncertainty of the U.S. nuclear umbrella’s reliability because Washington might not sacrifice San Francisco for Seoul or New York for Tallinn.22
An Overdue Modernization
The United States is in the midst of a comprehensive recapitalization and modernization of its nuclear arsenal that is scheduled to continue into the 2040s.23 This effort includes replacing every delivery platform; life-extending every warhead type; rebuilding the nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) infrastructure; and reconstituting the NNSA’s production complex. An all-inclusive and simultaneous modernization plan became necessary after two decades of deferred decisions. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Clinton administration essentially paused the nuclear weapons enterprise.24 Many facilities were decommissioned and hiring for the workforce slowed to a trickle as production ceased and the complex—under what would soon become the NNSA— shifted to stockpile stewardship. President George W. Bush’s administration was quickly preoccupied with counterterrorism, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
While the Obama administration refocused some attention through its nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and security efforts, the remaining nuclear hawks in Congress chose to tie overdue investments in nuclear modernization to further treaty reductions.25 As the Obama administration was finishing the negotiation of the New START Treaty, there was an agreement in the Senate to approve ratification in exchange for modernizing the triad.26 The treaty went into effect in 2011 and mandated a reduction of each nation’s respective arsenals to be limited to 1,550 deployed warheads on a total of 800 deployed and non-deployed delivery vehicles (ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers), of which a maximum of 700 can be deployed.27 The treaty limits will remain in effect until February 4, 2026. Meanwhile, Congress initiated the triad recapitalization program to replace the 14 Ohio-class nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) with 12 planned Columbia-class SSBNs, the 400 Minuteman III ICBMs with an equal number of Sentinel ICBMs, and the B-2 and most B-52s with the B-21 Raider.28 Because Washington had delayed so long, there is little to no insurance in the schedule to compensate for any additional delays before mandatory end-of-life retirements of the existing platforms.29
The recapitalization of the nuclear enterprise has suffered from project cost overruns and delays.30 A majority of NNSA facilities date back to the Cold War, with nearly a quarter dating to the Manhattan Project, and are woefully inadequate for effectively achieving current production rate targets, much less accelerating production.31 Unfortunately, the NNSA suffers from the pervasive modern affliction of poor mega-project execution.32 The NNSA Administrator has officially stated that it is impossible to meet the congressionally mandated target to produce 80 reserve war pits annually by the original date of 2030.33 As is unfortunately common in procurement and construction programs, the challenges go beyond simply requiring increased funding, especially as budgets have been consistently met and even increased by Congress.34 Rather, NNSA suffers the burdens of an inexperienced workforce; antiquated, confined, and contaminated sites; and an organizational culture that for decades has been primarily concerned with the scientific challenges of stockpile stewardship as opposed to industrial-scale production.35 If these challenges continue to inhibit NNSA from meeting, much less accelerating, its production goals, then likely the only solution is presidential-level prioritization and accountability.
A More Dangerous World
The geopolitical outlook for the United States in the first decade of this century was far less threatening than it is today. The prospect of major interstate conventional war, much less nuclear war, was slim. Strategic forces remained the foundation of the nation’s security, but many on the political left and some on the right sought to further diminish the role of nuclear weapons on moral and practical grounds.36 This was enthusiastically embraced by many U.S. allies and the non-aligned world that were pushing efforts to reduce stockpiles, design and implement global nuclear security norms, and incentivize the further diminishment of nuclear weapons in quantity and significance.37
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia became almost entirely reliant on its nuclear forces as its conventional forces withered.38 Even as the Kremlin worked to modernize its conventional forces, its nuclear modernization effort remained the most consistently funded. This has included the introduction of a new heavy ICBM, a new class of SSBN deploying a new SLBM, and a wide range of novel weapon systems including an air-launched ballistic missile and nuclear torpedo.39 As Russia’s relations with the United States and the West deteriorated, Moscow began more blatantly violating its arms control treaty commitments. Moscow has adopted a strategy of materially breaching its treaty commitments and then publicly denying any wrongdoing to force the United States to choose between abrogating the treaty or allowing Russian violations. This came to a head during the Trump administration, which was willing to bear the diplomatic cost of suspending U.S. treaty obligations in the face of blatant Russian treaty violations. In 2019, the Trump administration suspended U.S. obligations to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty after repeatedly protesting Russia’s continued deployment of a non-compliant new Russian intermediate range missile system.40 This was repeated in 2020 with the Open Skies Treaty where Russia was once again in violation by imposing restrictions on certain treaty guaranteed flights.41 Finally, since June 2022, Russia has ceased allowing New START Treaty authorized inspection activities in its territory and has also not exercised its right to inspect U.S. territory.42 Although Russia is not violating the treaty limits on numbers, for the first time in decades, there is no longer any confidence-building verification between the two major nuclear powers.
The Russian military has maintained much deeper theoretical and practical connections between its conventional and nuclear capabilities than Western militaries since the Cold War. After the drawdown of U.S. strategic forces in the 1990s, what became USSTRATCOM was a relative backwater within the U.S. military that was overwhelmingly focused on low-intensity conflicts in the Middle East. The Russian Armed Forces, by comparison, did not stop viewing NATO as the primary threat even when relations with the West were cooperative and their military was primarily concerned with suppressing Caucasian separatism.43 Nuclear weapons provided Moscow the only credible balance against overwhelming American conventional military superiority.
Until the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russian military interventions in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and north and central Africa did not involve nuclear rhetoric. However, Moscow has used exercises of its strategic forces to help deter Western responses to its military adventurism. For example, immediately preceding the second invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian strategic forces engaged in significant exercises as a signal to Western capitals of Russian resolve.44 Since the war began, the Russian government, including Putin himself, has made repeated nuclear threats against Ukraine and its Western backers.45 It is reasonable to speculate that Russia’s nuclear capabilities have been significantly responsible for the West’s refusal to intervene directly in Ukraine beyond material and financial support. While these public threats are primarily an exercise in coercive diplomacy directed at Western political leaders and publics, the Russian military has similarly grown more comfortable openly discussing—such as in journals and conferences—the continuum of military operations to include nuclear use.46 The much discussed and often exaggerated “escalate to deescalate” doctrine, regardless of how it may or may not be employed by the Kremlin, demonstrates the Russian view of nuclear weapons as a viable military instrument.47
Throughout the Cold War and up until quite recently, China maintained a minimal nuclear deterrent of approximately 250-400 weapons sufficient for countervalue targeting with a secure second strike against Russia and the United States.48 China has also maintained a no-first-use policy since becoming a nuclear power in 1964.49 However, Beijing has consistently refused to participate in any arms control discussions and is not party to any treaty restricting the size or capabilities of its arsenal.50 In the last few years, China has initiated a significant buildup as it now deploys a complete triad and is on track to grow to over 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade.51
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), like the Russians, have demonstrated through their internal commentary and force design a greater comfort with nuclear weapons serving as viable military instruments along a continuum of military options.52 The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) co-mingles nuclear and conventional rocket units and command and control infrastructure, which presents a new challenge for U.S. military planning that is accustomed to more clearly distinguished conventional and nuclear forces. If the PLA conducts a military operation, the United States will have to consider that any counterstrikes on PLARF units could risk inadvertently signaling an escalatory intent to target nuclear forces. The PLA’s conventional modernization, particularly of air and naval forces, indicates Beijing almost certainly aims to achieve conventional overmatch over the United States and its allies in the Western Pacific.53 However, China’s nuclear buildup and creation of a triad also suggests the PLA is making contingency plans to counter any potential U.S. nuclear capabilities and bolster their conventional deterrent to dissuade American military intervention in the Western Pacific.
Although Russia and China are the principal nuclear threats compelling a reassessment of U.S. nuclear doctrine, policymakers also expect the U.S. military to maintain additional limited nuclear capabilities to counter the much smaller challenges posed by North Korea and Iran.54 Both North Korea, which has a small but growing nuclear arsenal, and Iran, which continues its nuclear program, are currently primarily deterred from outright interstate aggression by U.S. conventional military dominance.55 However, Washington risks facing nuclear coercion by North Korea and Iran (if and when it develops nuclear weapons) due to an absence of more flexible tactical nuclear options. These challenges to U.S. decision-makers would be significantly magnified by any potential coordination with either Russia or China, which is plausible given the longstanding, albeit complicated, relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang and the budding relationships between Moscow and both Tehran and Pyongyang.56
Inflexible Constraints
The United States is severely constrained by the decisions that were made over the past three decades. The sheer complexity and scale of the ongoing program of record for nuclear modernization precludes swift adjustments, even if there was political will to immediately implement such changes. NNSA has seen consistent funding for the weapons program despite the post-pandemic downward pressure on the budget.57 The present fiscal reality is an effectively flat federal budget with inflation negating nominal growth.58 In the present political environment, there is no appetite for meaningful cuts to either non-defense spending or conventional defense accounts.59
The budgetary constraints are compounded by the physical constraints imposed by limited and aging infrastructure. The nuclear enterprise is significantly smaller following the post-Cold War drawdown and there are no plans for meaningful expansion. Decommissioned sites, such as Hanford, Washington, are undergoing expensive environmental cleanup operations if they are not already fully remediated, like Rocky Flats, Colorado.60 Even if there was a proposal to recommission or commission a new site, the necessary political will is presently absent to overcome the inevitable legal challenges to such a plan. The remaining operational NNSA labs, plants, and sites are largely in dire need of expensive modernization and environmental cleanup just to maintain the current program of record.61 The physical constraints extend to the broader defense industrial base responsible for recapitalizing the triad. American shipyards, aircraft lines, and missile production are already strained by the current nuclear and conventional defense orders.62 The Sentinel program has triggered a Nunn-McCurdy cost breach in large part because of ballooning construction costs for new missile silos, which the United States has not built in nearly half a century.63 Even if the defense industrial base expands with additional supplemental appropriations, orders for strategic forces will be in direct competition with the increasing conventional needs.
The final limiting factor is the workforce. There is a severe shortage of scientists, engineers, program managers, and tradesmen for the defense industrial base in general, and all the greater in niche positions like nuclear physicists and radiological-certified technicians.64 The NNSA is having to relearn many production methods and procedures from the Cold War, most notably plutonium pit production, and effectively redevelop a skilled workforce from scratch.65
The Manhattan Project is the obvious example of how quickly a massive program can be stood up, but it is also a stark reminder of the central role of political leadership. The United States does not need another Manhattan Project to rebuild its nuclear enterprise, but the scale of the challenge will still require an administration prioritizing budgets, resources, and personnel given the relative scarcity of all three. The status quo does not have enough unrealized capacity in appropriations, infrastructure, or workforce to enable any meaningful acceleration or expansion of the ongoing modernization plan barring significant political reprioritization.
The Limited Available Near-Term Options
Following the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026, the United States could immediately begin the process of uploading its ICBMs and SLBMs with additional warheads from the strategic stockpile.66 The Minuteman IIIs currently carry a single warhead, but can carry three. It would likely take more than a year to accomplish such an upload without risking taking too much of the force offline. The Navy would face similar time constraints uploading its Trident force while maintaining its patrol schedule. The Air Force and Navy will also be able to develop or restore a nuclear delivery capability to various platforms.67 The decommissioned missile tubes on Ohio-class submarines can be brought back online, but that would require significant port time to overhaul. The Air Force can also re-certify additional B-52s for nuclear missions to provide a short-term boost to the nuclear-capable strategic bomber force. The B-1 bomber fleet is rapidly approaching the end of its service life, and while it is technically possible to make the platform nuclear-capable again, the cost would outweigh the limited flight hours bought.68
In the medium term, to maintain the nuclear umbrella over its East Asian allies, the United States should seek to develop new regional capabilities.69 The reintroduction of SLCM-N on SSNs and major surface combatants is likely the quickest, most relevant, and most achievable new capability.70 It has the benefit of being far less dependent on allied acquiescence and provides significant flexibility given the weapons move with the ships. Congress has maintained this program over the objections of the Biden administration, but it will be years before SLCM-Ns are meaningfully reintroduced to the fleet. The Navy could also reintroduce regular deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to its carrier strike groups.71 Finally, the Air Force or the Army could develop medium- or intermediate-range land-based missiles (like the Pershing II) that could be deployed on allied territory and/or U.S. Pacific territories, as well as in Europe.72
The U.S. military has already made promising efforts to begin reintroducing nuclear warfighting into routine operational planning. For example, USSTRATCOM has made tremendous progress in coordinating and involving itself with the regional combatant commands.73 These measures should continue and increasingly incorporate close allies if deterrence is to remain credible to those adversaries that already view limited nuclear warfighting as a viable option in their military planning. The Air Force could slightly increase its nuclear-capable bomber readiness rates, although the size of the fleet will seriously constrain any ability to return to Strategic Air Command (SAC) operational tempo of the Cold War.74 The Air Force has claimed that returning to a SAC-era nuclear alert status would break the bomber force in six months.75 The credibility of the deterrent improves the more the U.S. military exercises its nuclear forces and incorporates nuclear warfighting into its planning.
Politically Difficult Long-Term Options
The easier options outlined previously are uploading the reserve, reintroducing a greater variety of capabilities, and increasing the readiness of the force. There are additional longer-term options that are likely more politically challenging to implement. The most necessary policy change will be authorizing the design of additional new warheads. The arsenal for the next decades will be dependent on the existing life-extended warhead types given the necessary lead time in designing, producing, and integrating warheads with delivery systems. Once the current life-extension programs and W93 are closer to completion, however, there would be an opportunity to produce new designs, including introducing new components, considering the tremendous technological advances since the last of the current warheads was designed in the late 1980s.76
Washington could revisit the option of space-based weapons and U.S.-based road mobile ICBM launchers.77 The siloed ICBM force remains secure and responsive, which places a significant burden on any potential adversary contemplating a first strike. However, as missile accuracy continues to improve, the targeting challenge imposed on the adversary diminishes until theoretically requiring one warhead per silo. Meanwhile, the submarine-based second strike could become vulnerable in the coming decades as the proliferation of surface and submersible autonomous vehicles potentially eliminates the survivability of submarines.78 Space-based weapons are currently prohibited by treaty, but Russia has already begun compromising this norm with its development of a nuclear space weapon.79
Road mobile ICBM launchers pose an additional complication on the adversary’s targeting requirements.80 However, these benefits are undermined since it is politically and fiscally prohibitive for the government to create large ranges closed to the public. There would be domestic political opposition to having ICBMs driven near rural communities or wilderness areas on moral, environmental, and health safety grounds.81 There is also a security challenge inherent to driving mobile launchers through an open liberal society where public reporting or foreign agents can partially negate any secrecy of movement.
The United States could also reconsider its prohibition on underground nuclear testing implemented in 1992.82 Testing provides practical technical benefits by confirming the effectiveness of the design and production practices.83 It could also have a deterrence benefit by demonstrating the reliability and effectiveness of the arsenal. There would almost certainly be a diplomatic cost given the longstanding pause on testing, but this would presumably be significantly negated if the United States resumed in response to adversary testing.84
Perhaps the most controversial policy change would be to abandon the nonproliferation stance and allow or even enable proliferation to specific allies. Japan and South Korea are the most likely to develop their own nuclear capabilities, as they both face adversarial nuclear neighbors and have the means with mature scientific, civil nuclear, and defense industry establishments.85 Taiwan also has both a clear strategic rationale and ability, particularly given that it has had multiple clandestine nuclear programs over the decades.86 Washington still holds that any nuclear proliferation dangerously adds to strategic instability and increases the risk of intentional or accidental nuclear use.87 Intentional proliferation only becomes conceivable in a transformed political context where the nuclear threat to the country has justified a wholesale adjustment in policy.
Foreboding Future
Washington is faced with the choice of maintaining the current pace of modernization and being compelled to reassess its targeting plans and commitments to provide a nuclear umbrella to allies in Europe and Asia or, alternatively, it could maintain its current security commitments and targeting plans by accelerating modernization efforts and expanding the size of its nuclear arsenal. The current modernization plan even under optimistic timeframes does not provide the number and variety of nuclear capabilities necessary to keep current targeting assumptions against both Russia and China, much less additional adversaries.88 Washington risks overextending its commitments.89
If deterrence is a combination of capability and credibility, the United States is at risk of lacking both. The worst-case scenario would be that China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—or some combination thereof—coordinate aggressive acts to put simultaneous strain on stretched U.S. strategic forces and force Washington to face politically impossible trade-offs. This risk can fuel a vicious cycle where the inadequacy of U.S. strategic forces, whether accurately perceived or not, leaves the United States and its allies more likely to be tested. Washington will be confronted for the first time in decades with either reneging on treaty commitments, changing targeting preferences, or expanding its nuclear arsenal.
Ultimately, this is a domestic political challenge. The rapidly deteriorating strategic environment has not resulted in any meaningful shift in U.S. force posture, despite some welcome recommendations from the Strategic Posture Commission in October 2023.90 It goes beyond the scope of this article and the capacities of this author to do more than speculate, but it seems there will need to be an extraordinary event that unequivocally exposes to policymakers in Washington and the American public the unsuitability of the nuclear posture to guarantee U.S. national security. The political sensitivity and scale of resourcing involved will necessitate sustained attention by the White House and Congress. Sadly, something on the magnitude of a failure to protect an ally or an outright limited nuclear use by an adversary would motivate the level of change necessary.
The views expressed in this article are those of this author alone and do not reflect the views of any current or former employer.
Image: Small Boy nuclear test 1962, July 14, 1962, from National Nuclear Security Administration. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Small_Boy_nuclear_test_1962.jpg#file, used under Wikimedia Commons.
[1] Kingston Reif, “New START and Nuclear Modernization,” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, December 15, 2010, https://armscontrolcenter.org/new-start-and-nuclear-modernization.
[2] Bill Gertz, “China’s ‘breathtaking’ nuclear arms push a rising challenge, Stratcom chief says,” Washington Times, July 28, 2022, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/jul/28/chinas-nuclear-arms-push-rising-challenge-stratcom/.
[3] Dmitry Adamsky, “Russia’s New Nuclear Normal,” Foreign Affairs, May 19, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/russian-federation/russias-new-nuclear-normal.
[4] U.S. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, by Madelyn R. Creedon et al. (Washington, DC: 2023) https://www.ida.org/research-and-publications/publications/all/a/am/americas-strategic-posture.
[5] U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Weapons: NNSA Does Not Have a Comprehensive Schedule or Cost Estimate for Pit Production Capability, GAO-23-104661 (Washington, DC, 2023), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-104661.pdf.
[6] U.S. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture.
[7] U.S. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture.
[8] Robert Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 8-9.
[9] Colin S. Gray, “Deterrence Resurrected: Revisiting Some Fundamentals,” Parameters 40, no. 4 (Winter 2010), 99-106.
[10] John T. Correll, “The Ups and Downs of Counterforce,” Air and Space Forces Magazine, October 1, 2005, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1005counterforce/.
[11] Gray, “Deterrence Resurrected: Revisiting Some Fundamentals,” 99-106.
[12] Gray, “Deterrence Resurrected: Revisiting Some Fundamentals,” 99-106.
[13] U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (Washington, DC, 2022), 8.
[14] U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, 8.
[15] Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture.
[16] Michael R. Gordon, “China Has More ICBM Launchers Than U.S., American Military Reports,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-has-more-icbm-launchers-than-u-s-american-military-reports-11675779463.
[17] U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs, by Mary Beth D. Nikiting, IF10472 (2023), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/IF10472.pdf; Dan De Luce, “Iran Has Enough Uranium to Build an Atomic Bomb, U.N. Agency Says,” NBC News, May 31, 2022, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/iran-enough-uranium-build-atomic-bomb-un-says-%20rcna31246; “The nuclear arsenals of China, India and Pakistan are growing,” The Economist, August 11, 2022, https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/08/11/the-nuclear-arsenals-of-china-india-and-pakistan-are-growing.
[18] U.S. Department of Defense, 2022 Nuclear Posture Review.
[19] U.S. Department of Defense, “Statement on the Fielding of the W76-2 Low-Yield Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile Warhead,” February 4, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2073532/statement-on-the-fielding-of-the-w76-2-low-yield-submarine-launched-ballistic-m/; Kyle Mizokami, “A New and Controversial U.S. Nuclear Weapon Goes to Sea,” Popular Mechanics, January 30, 2020, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a30708035/w76-2-nuclear-weapon-submarine/; Alan Cummings, “A Better Case for SLCM-N,” Proceedings 150, no.4 (April 2024), https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2024/april/better-case-slcm-n.
[20] Cummings, “A Better Case for SLCM-N.”
[21] Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture.
[22] Jennifer Bradley, “Preventing the Nuclear Jungle: Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Nonproliferation,” Joint Force Quarterly 112 (January 2024), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-112/Article/Article/3679143/preventing-the-nuclear-jungle-extended-deterrence-assurance-and-nonproliferation/.
[23] Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture.
[24] “Clinton Issues New Guidelines on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Doctrine,” Arms Control Today, November 1997, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/1997-11/news/clinton-issues-new-guidelines-us-nuclear-weapons-doctrine.
[25] Steven Pifer, “10 years after Obama’s nuclear free vision, the US and Russia head in the opposite direction,” Brookings Institution, April 4, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/10-years-after-obamas-nuclear-free-vision-the-us-and-russia-head-in-the-opposite-direction/.
[26] Reif, “New START and Nuclear Modernization.”
[27] “New START Treaty,” U.S. Department of State, last updated June 1, 2023, https://www.state.gov/new-start/.
[28] U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces, by Amy F. Woolf, IF10519 (2023), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10519.
[29] Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s Strategic Posture, 43.
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