The U.S. Indo-Pacific alliance architecture has undergone a sweeping evolution, away from the legacy U.S.-centric hub-and-spoke model to an interlocking ‘spiderweb’ nodal model spearheaded by key regional players. This shift recontextualizes the United States’ role in the Indo-Pacific from a primary mover to an energetic coordinator, thus enabling a more resilient and agile alliance structure, combining alliance efforts at a greater scale and effectiveness, and improving the application of scarce U.S. resources. It is critical that U.S. policymakers seize this new role to meet the challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and other revisionist states to preserve the security and prosperity of the U.S.-led international order.
This paper analyzes the current spiderweb architecture through its three key regional hubs to illuminate implications for policymakers. It begins with an overview of the hub-and-spoke, nodal, and spiderweb alliance models before outlining the current security environment to highlight the need for America’s alliance systems. It then examines the major players who define the current spiderweb system and ends by discussing key implications for policymakers.
The Legacy Hub-and Spoke Architecture
The legacy alliance architecture in the Indo-Pacific, known as the hub-and-spoke model, was established during the Cold War.1 A hub-and-spoke alliance system is characterized by a security guarantor, the ‘hub,’ that maintains a series of bilateral alliances with multiple states while the ‘spokes’ lack significant independent linkages between them. Since hub-and-spoke systems lack substantial coordination mechanisms, they fail to deliver the benefits gained from pooling members’ capabilities found in a traditional multilateral alliance—an alliance where members develop linkages within an overarching organization.2
For this reason, a multilateral organization such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would have been a preferable architecture in Asia as the Cold War began. However, the necessary factors present in Europe were absent from the geopolitics of the Pacific. In Europe, the Soviet Union represented a single, immediate threat placing pressure on allies to develop structures to balance against it. In the Pacific, the states did not share a similar conception of the security threats, with different states focused on the Soviet Union, the PRC, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to various degrees.4
Additionally, although animosities between European states were intense—Germany was widely viewed with as much suspicion as the Soviets—there existed a centuries-old conception of Europe that helped promote unity. No such conception existed in Asia where multiple deep-seated animosities—some centuries old, some fresh from the Japanese occupation—existed between the states.
Attempts at Pacific multilateralism, such as the 1954 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), failed to gain traction. Founded to contain communism in Asia, SEATO failed to harmonize the interests of its member states, which ranged from imperialist France to newly independent Pakistan. The discordance of interests stifled national contributions, crippling SEATO’s effectiveness.5 SEATO withered before finally being disbanded in 1977.
In lieu of a viable multilateral architecture, the United States established bilateral security arrangements in the region: Australia and the Philippines in 1951; Japan 1960; South Korea in 1953; Thailand in 1962; and Taiwan in 1954 up until 1979.6 While this hub-and-spoke system served its purpose during the Cold War, U.S. policymakers have long desired a multilateral solution in Asia.7
Today’s Architecture: The Spiderweb
The present U.S. Indo-Pacific alliance architecture has evolved from its Cold War foundations to constitute a nodal alliance system, referred to here as ‘The Indo-Pacific Spiderweb Alliance Architecture.’ Nodal systems contain clusters of allies and partners that are connected through overlapping, formal and informal, bilateral, minilateral, and multilateral linkages. They are organized around threats and interests and are usually led by a “regional hub.”8 While the security guarantor still plays a critical role, it is no longer central, or even involved, in every cluster or linkage.9
This architecture allows states to coordinate on specific goals, leveraging their resources beyond the capability of any one state.10 Since the architecture is decentralized, nodal systems achieve enhanced flexibility and resilience uncommon in traditional hub-and-spoke or multilateral alliances, which require top-down direction or broad consensus.11
The current Indo-Pacific system, the Spiderweb, showcases a nodal variant distinguished by the interlocking web of bilateral and multilateral agreements within and across clusters that characterize the architecture. Instead of each cluster being centered on an individual threat as portrayed in ideal nodal theory, the Spiderweb encompasses multiple clusters that are particularly driven by overlapping interests amongst the key regional hubs.12
The Spiderweb Architecture is a profound positive step forward for U.S. Indo-Pacific alliances. The emergence of capable regional actors provides critical momentum and dynamism in support of U.S. interests. In addition to magnifying U.S. efforts, these states have the local presence to affect meaningful change in regions that remain elusive to U.S. influence.13
Stringing the Web
The evolution of the Spiderweb was caused by three factors: the emergence of China as an aggressor, increased regional connectivity, and the rise of regional actors capable of independent action. After the Cold War, the hub-and-spoke system remained intact, with the addition of Singapore in 2005. However, the disappearance of the Soviet Union and fading perception of the PRC threat deemphasized these arrangements. Still, sporadic efforts to enhance cooperation among the allies were taken. Threats emanating from the DPRK lingered, while an explosion of economic activity helped connect the region.15 Events like the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami led to a closer cooperation through the creation of the ad hoc progenitor of the Quad consisting of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.16
The alliance architecture did not see significant evolution until the emergence of China as a potential aggressor in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Although it is difficult to point to a singular inflection point, a confluence of events—increased PRC aggression over territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, economic assertiveness, accelerating military modernization, and the 2012 appointment of Xi Jinping as General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—sparked an increased awareness of China’s rise and intentions.17
In particular, PRC assertiveness drew increased U.S. attention towards the region at the end of the second Bush administration and accelerating through the subsequent Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. U.S. attention brought greater diplomatic engagement, military deployments, and investment. The increase in U.S. overt engagement efforts, and its pivot of concrete resources, helped expedite regional transformation.18
The 1980s to the post-Cold War period also saw the emergence of multiple regional powers across the Indo-Pacific. Japan’s economic miracle prompted rapid growth until it was the world’s second largest economy, a feat only surpassed by China in 2010.19 Other powers, including the Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) and India, also grew to fill the space.20 The result was a dynamism and ability for independent action that was lacking in the Cold War.
The current Indo-Pacific Spiderweb Alliance Architecture is defined by the actions of three regional hubs—Japan, Australia, and India—discussed in detail later. These states have built on Cold War–era foundations to propagate a web of bilateral and multilateral relations across the Indo-Pacific and with partners in Europe to counter the influence of the PRC and enhance their security. Together these trends led to the emergence and acceleration of the Spiderweb Alliance Architecture.
Relevance for Policymakers
This emerging model represents a windfall for U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific. The Spiderweb Architecture allows the United States to leverage linkages across its allies and partners to achieve greater cooperation and coordination than was possible in the hub-and-spoke system.
To avail itself of this opportunity, U.S. policymakers must embrace the United States’ new role in the Indo-Pacific as alliance coordinator rather than prime driver. This will require adopting a different kind of U.S. leadership better attuned to the broad span of national interests that motivate its allies and partners. Attempts to over-centralize and over-formalize the architecture will run afoul of the wide-ranging national interests. The United States will be required to understand its various alliance systems in their global context, weighing the full range of threats to the U.S.-led order against the regional security challenges.
Overview of the Current Security Environment
The current global security environment highlights the United States’ profound need for a robust Indo-Pacific alliance architecture. The Indo-Pacific region represents over half the world’s population and 60 percent of its GDP.21 If an adversary were able to control this decisive region, they would be able to project influence across the globe, dictating global economic flows while obtaining the resources to build impressive technological and military capabilities. Such an outcome would represent a direct threat to the U.S.-led international order and, in turn, U.S. security and prosperity.22
The PRC has emerged as a power in this decisive region and represents a pervasive threat to the U.S.-led order. The PRC’s stated national objective is to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049.23 The PRC believes that this rejuvenation will require the revision of “the international order in support of the PRC’s system of governance and national interests” and that the United States is actively seeking to contain China’s rise.24 In pursuit of this strategy, the PRC has waged a campaign to degrade the U.S.-led order, establish an alternative system of PRC-led global governance, and coerce nations that object to Chinese interests.25
Over the past two decades, China has sought to coopt Western institutions such as the World Trade Organization, which it effectively used to gain market access while deflecting accusations of unfair practices.26 Additionally, China has utilized alternative organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the BRICS+ formulation to present an alternative vision of global governance.27
With its economic might, China wields significant leverage over many economies, allowing it to punish states that speak or act against PRC interest.28 Stark examples include PRC punitive economic warfare against Australia in 2020 over calls for an investigation into COVID-19 and Lithuania in 2021 for increased relations with Taiwan.29 Chinese economic investment, including its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), continues to grant China influence across the developing world through investment, predatory ownership, and payment practices.30
Militarily, the PRC remains committed to achieving a “world class military by 2049” with critical 2027 and 2035 transformation milestones.31 The PLA Navy (PLAN) is already the largest navy on earth and is projected to continue to outstrip U.S. shipbuilding.32 Similarly, China is expanding and modernizing its air, land, missile, and nuclear forces.33 China utilizes its military, including militia and proxy forces, to coerce neighbors.34 This has been evident in the increase of air and maritime violations of Taiwanese sovereignty, deadly border clashes against Indian troops, and maritime clashes in the South China Sea against the Philippines and Vietnam.35
The Role of U.S. Allies and Partners
These threats are daunting and will require the United States to rely on its allies and partners. Through cooperation, the United States gains key advantages and can achieve greater results than possible through independent U.S. action. First, allies provide the United States with geographic proximity in the Pacific where America suffers from the tyranny of distance. U.S. naval bases in Hawaii and California sit, respectively, over 3,500 and 4,500 miles away from Japan, impeding the United States’ ability to respond quickly to crises or maintain the presence necessary to compete day-to-day against China. Forward presence with allies helps address this gap while strengthening assurance to allies and deterrence to adversaries.36
Additionally, allies and partners bring their own capabilities to the competition. These forces supplement U.S. resources to rapidly improve the force calculations.37 They also provide a pre-existing forward presence ready to react to crises. Alliances help overcome collective problems prior to need, further enhancing the aggregative strength of resources.38 Allies and partners play a critical role as co-guarantors of the current order acting as local champions of the system.
Japan: The Regional Core
Japan is the most important U.S. defense partner in the Indo-Pacific. It has taken on a leading role in shaping the Indo-Pacific region, becoming a core leader of the regional and global order. Japan’s central location enables a sizable U.S. military presence including the Seventh Fleet and the United States’ only continuously forward-deployed carrier strike group, granting impressive forward presence.39
Throughout the Cold War, Japan viewed geopolitics as a secondary concern, constrained by its postwar constitution and protected by the U.S. security umbrella. However, starting in the late 2000s, Japan began to shift in response to the changing security environment. This shift was championed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe who set the tone for geopolitical engagement, popularizing the concept of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific.’40
As part of this effort, Japan undertook fundamental reforms such as ending the total export ban of defense materials and the passage of a contentious constitutional amendment to allow a more expansive exercise of “collective self-defense.”41 These reforms made Japan an increasingly capable partner to states such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which it helped supply with surveillance equipment and patrol ships in reaction to increased Chinese maritime aggression.42
Japan also played a significant role in the founding of multiple alliance structures. Principal of these is the Quad. Championed by Abe, the Quad was established in 2006 to develop an Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.43 Although short-lived due to differences in perception of the PRC, the first Quad led to a flurry of increased ties among the members including trilateral relationships between Japan, India, and Australia.44 Reestablished in 2017, the Quad remains one of the critical pillars of U.S. alliances in the region, facilitating military exercises, vaccine cooperation, and regular ministerial meetings.45
Japan is also a member of the critical trilateral U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) relationship that was solidified in the August 2023 Camp David Summit. The agreed-upon increase in regular summits, trilateral exercises, and contingency planning offers immense security benefits.46 Additionally, Japan has made shifts in its support to Taiwan with a 2021 defense white paper stating that the Taiwanese security situation is “important for Japan’s security and the stability of the international community.”47
Moreover, Japan plays a profound role in the economic sphere. Following the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Japan took the lead in salvaging the agreement by establishing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), helping deepen economic engagement across the Pacific.48 Japan has also played an active role countering the Chinese BRI through initiatives such as the joint India-Japan Act East Forum and Asia-Africa Growth Corridor that serve as alternative investment vehicles across the Indo-Pacific.49
In 2023, Japan continued to make concerted strides to enhance its military capability, announcing the intention to double its defense spending by 2027 and accelerate the acquisition of capabilities such as long range missiles.50 Japan is likely to continue expanding its diplomatic presence both in the region and across the globe, potentially participating in technological cooperation within the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS).51 The sum of these efforts has been the emergence of the new and dynamic Indo-Pacific order.
Australia: The English Speaking Peoples
In homage to former German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s prediction of a previous century, it could be said the most significant event of the twenty-first century is the fact that the Americans and Australians speak English. Beyond that surface-level observation, the U.S.-Australian alliance is close and long-lived. Since the First World War, Australia and the United States have fought together in every major conflict.52 Both are members of the “Five Eye” English-speaking intelligence alliance. The U.S.-Australia security guarantee stretches back to the original 1951 ANZUS Treaty.
Despite that background, Australia’s path to a role as a regional player has been more circuitous. For years, Australia has straddled the line in the Pacific.53 On the one hand, Australia sought to maintain its historic security relationship with the United States. In addition to contributing to the Global War on Terror, Australia joined the Quad as well as various bilateral and trilaterals with Japan and India.54 At the same time, Australia hoped to maintain a strong economic relationship with China, its largest trading partner. This strategy of hedging became increasingly difficult through the 2010s with Australia increasingly leaning towards the United States by 2017.55 This trend accelerated in 2020, following the onset of the Chinese trade war against Australia in response to its calls for an independent COVID-19 inquiry.56 This, along with other acts of Chinese coercion, led Australia to more forcefully side with the United States in the broader strategic competition and announce major increases to its defense budget beginning in 2020.57
Within the broader alliance architecture, Australia plays less of a leading role than Japan, although it is a key participant in the major quadrilateral, trilateral, and bilateral agreements mentioned previously. Australia has also helped foster engagement through other agreements such as the AUKUS deal, an enhanced defense pact with Indonesia, and increased cooperation with ASEAN.58
Australia plays a substantial role in outreach to the Pacific Islands, a significant blind spot for U.S. policy despite their strategic importance.59 Highlights of this effort include increased engagements through the Pacific Islands Forum and its recent strategic partnership with Papua New Guinea.60
Australia’s growing role in the Spiderweb is likely to persist, showcased by the continuity between both Conservative and Labor governments.61 Particularly, Australia remains set to continue its military buildup, announcing its intention to more than double its surface fleet amongst other defense investments and increasing U.S. basing in Northern Australia.62
India: The Powerful Wildcard
As one of the key regional players to emerge in the Indo-Pacific, India represents a dichotomy that presents both opportunities and challenges. From one perspective, the alignment of interests seems notable. India is the world’s largest democracy. Indian sentiment is solidly anti-China, as Indian and Chinese troops clash from Bhutan through the Himalayas.63 India has been a member in multiple Indo-Pacific initiatives, such as the Quad and bilateral efforts with Japan to blunt BRI.64 As the West works to selectively decouple from China, India has provided a welcome alternative to diversify manufacturing and supply chains.
Additionally, India is a major player in Southeast Asia, a region where the United States has less influence. Working through its Look/Act East Policy, India has become an ally to states such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei that struggle against Chinese aggression and territorial claims in the South China Sea, supporting them through arms sales and joint naval drills.65
India also works with states to provide alternatives to BRI, including financing a port in Indonesia and a highway across India, Myanmar, and Thailand with planned connections to Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.66 India maintains a growing relationship with Indonesia, both bilaterally and through ASEAN, signing a defense cooperation agreement in 2018. India is also fostering relations with Cambodia and Laos.67
However, India’s broader orientation vis-à-vis the U.S.-led order is more complicated. India’s Cold War legacy as leader of the non-alignment movement, as well as its membership in the BRICS+, calls into question the depth of Indian support for the current world order.68 Support for initiatives such as de-dollarization, strong ties with Russia, and a doubtful commitment to stand against China in conflict, all deepen the uncertainty.69 India’s role in the Indo-Pacific is likely to remain dominated by this dichotomy with India’s great promise and influence balanced by its inclinations for an alternative to the Western-led order.
The Broader Web: Regional Actors
Beyond the three principal regional players, there are other members of the broader Spiderweb Architecture. Foremost of these is South Korea. A key player in Northeast Asia, Seoul has tried to expand its influence through the aforementioned U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral alliance and its New Southern Policy.70 Despite this, South Korea is constrained in its ability to take a leading role in the region by its preoccupation with its imminent security threat, the DPRK.71 Seoul’s ability to expand its geopolitical profile will be important to monitor in the future. Taiwan occupies a similar space to South Korea, an advanced democracy whose geopolitics is defined by its near threat, the PRC. Taiwan is a critical part of the Spiderweb, marking the frontier of the architecture.
Other states such as Vietnam and the Philippines lack the capability to be independent regional centers despite being critical links. Each occupies a strategic geopolitical position in the region making it critical to continue efforts to link these states to the architecture.
Indo-Pacific to Europe Connection
The other distinguishing factor of the Spiderweb Architecture is the increasing cooperation among U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. As Chinese aggression expanded through the 2010s, European reactions mirrored those of Indo-Pacific states. By 2019, the European Union (EU) declared China a competitor and systemic rival in the EU Strategic Compass.72
The United Kingdom and France play the most active role in the Indo-Pacific. The French consider themselves an Indo-Pacific power due to their territorial holdings in the region.73 France has sought to cultivate stronger security ties through enhanced defense cooperation, maritime exercises, and information sharing with Australia, India, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Singapore.74
The United Kingdom has pursued its “Indo-Pacific tilt” as part of the broader Global Britain post-Brexit approach.75 In keeping with this effort, Britain is seeking to join the CPTPP economic group and has sought to expand its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, including the high-profile deployment of the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier.76 Britain is a key member of the AUKUS defense cooperation agreement and is spearheading the development of the Tempest sixth-generation fighter with Italy and Japan.77
Finally, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific continues to mature. Although NATO’s mandate does not apply to the Indo-Pacific, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has said “what happens in Asia and the Indo-Pacific matters for Europe.”78 This sentiment is clearly reflected in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept—“[The PRC’s] stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values”—and in the increased involvement of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea with NATO.79
While both sides increasingly recognize the shared threat to the international order, geographic separation, limitations of European hard power, and reluctance amongst some states to be drawn into a U.S.-China competition will likely limit the extent of cooperation.80
Implications for Policymakers
The benefits of the Spiderweb Alliance Architecture are enormous. Empowered regional players are able to build independent clusters and networks, undertake tailored initiatives, and achieve combined efforts countering the PRC at a scale impossible for the United States to accomplish alone. Each cluster is able to leverage the combined capabilities and local knowledge of its members to achieve targeted effects across key regions and issues. This would be unlikely, if not impossible, in the legacy architecture.
In the Spiderweb Alliance, the United States assumes a different role in the Indo-Pacific. Previously, it was necessary for the United States to act as the prime mover and to be actively engaged in nearly every endeavor. Now the United States can act as the energetic coordinator harmonizing the various webs, facilitating increased connections, and bringing U.S. mass to bear at decisive points.
This role does not imply a decreased need for U.S. leadership. On the contrary, the continued success of the Spiderweb Architecture depends on U.S. engagement to guide and synchronize efforts across the various clusters. The United States should continue to work to expand and strengthen the Spiderweb by empowering the various actors through continuous and multifaceted engagement. Efforts such as supporting the rapprochement between Japan and the ROK are critical to the alliance’s success.
U.S. policymakers must consider all of the myriad national interests and caveats to successfully avail itself of the Spiderweb’s flexibility. Each cluster is in essence a bespoke coalition of states united in interest to address a specific challenge. Correctly crafting these clusters will require policymakers to evaluate and match various national interests with the optimal initiatives and efforts.
U.S. policymakers should seek to shape European engagement in the Indo-Pacific to maximize global benefits. Europe has much to offer diplomatically, technologically, and economically in the global competition in support of the Western order. On these issues, the United States should energetically support engagement between its Indo-Pacific and European allies. However, European hard power is likely better suited to address other threats to the international order, such as Russia and Iran.
Managing the U.S.-India relationship will remain an enduring challenge to U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific. India is invaluable due to its size and general orientation to China. Opportunities to cooperate on investment, friendshoring, and regional engagement abound. However, India’s historic role in the non-alignment movement, demonstrated today by its membership in the BRICS+ formulation, presents a deep challenge. India’s role as a partner must be carefully managed to ensure certain links in the architecture are not limited in their potential by this divergence of interest.
Conclusion
The challenge posed by the PRC and other revisionist states is daunting. Chinese victory in the Indo-Pacific could strike a death blow to the Western rules-based order with far-reaching deleterious effects to the security and prosperity of the United States. To meet this challenge, the United States must leverage its vast system of partners in the region and across the globe. To this end, the United States is well postured. The Spiderweb Alliance Architecture is likely to endure and accelerate in the coming years. Driven by the Chinese strategic priority of “national rejuvenation,” the strategic direction of the regional pillars—Japan, India, and Australia—is likely set.81
To fully maximize and leverage the potential of the Spiderweb, the United States must commit sustained strategic attention and engagement, nimbly energizing and managing the complex array of alliances at its fingertips. If the United States fails to meet this challenge, it will require greater investments in blood and treasure in the future to maintain its security or, failing that, an acquiescence to a future where that security fully slips away.
The views expressed in this article are those of this author alone and do not reflect the views of his employer or any entities affiliated with the author.
Image: Quad-Leader’s-Meeting-Tokyo2022, May 24, 2022, from QUAD Leader’s Meeting Tokyo 2022. Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:QUAD-Leader%27s-Meeting-Tokyo2022_2_07.jpg, used under Wikimedia Commons.
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