The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is competing to win against the United States in the Middle East. This competition, however, is not about land. It is about influence.
Over recent decades, the United States established a dominant position in the Middle East through decisive military action and diplomatic influence. The deployment of military force and economic sanctions in response to Saddam Hussein’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait, for example, set the stage for U.S. power projection in the Middle East. However, the regional landscape is shifting. Strategic missteps by the United States since September 11 eroded U.S. authority and opened the door for other emerging powers like China to challenge American hegemony and redefine the balance of power. Unlike the direct confrontations of the past, geopolitical supremacy is now secured by winning the hearts and minds of both regional elites and their populations.
Findings from a 2023 Arab youth survey highlight China’s increasing appeal among 18-24-year-old Arab men and women. Despite this appeal, two-thirds of survey respondents viewed the United States as a more crucial ally in the coming five years.1 These findings suggest that while the United States is still considered the primary power in the region, support for China is on the rise. Beijing’s growing popularity among Arab youth is likely driven by both commercial engagement and negative perceptions of U.S. leadership. China’s growing influence will not only depend on the support of Arab youth. Beijing must ultimately convince Middle East and North African (MENA) elites that the region will benefit more by breaking away from the U.S. orbit to enjoy China’s foreign policy and assistance.2
The United States and China use different approaches to secure influence in the region. The United States has long undervalued perception management, choosing instead to project its hard power at key historical moments. Since China does not have the same hard-power capabilities as the United States, it must shore up its influence through asymmetric means. Beijing shapes public perception by manipulating foreign information to portray a positive narrative on Chinese international engagement.
Manipulation of the media space is a tried and tested tactic for China. During the “charm campaigns” of the 1990s, Beijing expanded its state media enterprise to spread pro-China messaging to audiences outside of the country.3 The effectiveness of this strategy, however, was inconsistent. China-centric topics did not resonate with target countries unless they were tied to “hot button” social issues.4
Palestinian nationalism resonates with Arab populations in the Middle East, providing China with an opportunity to strengthen its image amidst Israel’s ground offensive in Gaza. By leveraging outlets like Xinhua and China Global Television Network (CGTN), China is asserting itself as the next global leader by discrediting U.S. influence and portraying itself as a key interlocutor to bring peace to the region.
This form of information warfare by China redefines the rules of engagement in a region historically dominated by the United States. To better understand the effectiveness of media engagement in the Middle East, this analysis delves into the evolving nature of China’s narrative warfare tactics. Lessons learned by China during the 1990s informed the intricate web of strategies employed by Beijing to bolster its influence in the Middle East.
China’s Charm Offensive: 1990-2010
Beijing’s leadership believes that Western countries such as the United States exert global dominance because they possess what Chinese academics call “discourse power.” First used in the 1990s, this Chinese term referred to a type of narrative agenda-setting ability which gave countries such as the United States authority to shape global governance, values, and norms to exert global dominance.5
Following its economic opening in 1978, China struggled to shape global narratives because of the strength of Western “discourse power,” i.e. Western media. Beijing’s 1989 violent crackdown against pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square further damaged China’s global image. To reshape its image and expand its influence, China embarked on a global charm offensive that spanned from the 1990s to the early 2010s. As part of this campaign, media narratives portrayed Beijing as a leader of the “global south,” a power that inherently understood the needs of developing countries, respected political and cultural norms, and did not pose a threat to the sovereignty of other nations.6 The rest of the world was not convinced. Beijing’s territorial clashes with Vietnam and the Philippines in the South China Sea in the 1990s, combined with complaints by investors of China’s unfair trade practices, tarnished Beijing’s international standing.
Instead of changing their behavior, Chinese leaders changed their media strategy. In 2004, CCP leaders announced that Beijing would implement a new Chinese public diplomacy strategy.7 China invested millions of dollars to expand its media tools and tailor its pro-China messages to regions where the CCP was looking to invest its resources. China’s main broadcasting arm, CGTN, was restructured, while other global broadcasting channels like China Radio International (CRI) and two news agencies—Xinhua and China News Service—underwent improvements to broaden its global reach.8
Southeast Asia was the perfect candidate to test this new media strategy because several countries were already skeptical of Chinese investment and foreign aid. While Malaysia and Thailand regarded China positively, staunch U.S. allies such as the Philippines and Australia were more cautious.9 To soften the perception of Chinese economic engagement, Beijing expanded its media outreach, training programs, and public diplomacy efforts across the region with mixed success. In Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Timor-Leste, China successfully improved its image as a positive force of change. However, this optimism was not shared by the whole region. Singapore and Vietnam did not buy into Chinese narratives and, by the mid-2010s, public perceptions of China in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole declined significantly.10
China’s charm campaign failed for two main reasons. First, Beijing undermined its own narratives because of its aggressive behavior against countries in the South China Sea. Second, Chinese state media like Xinhua and CGTN were criticized for lacking engaging content and were perceived as vehicles for propaganda.11 Journalists at these outlets struggled to appeal to foreign audiences because they avoided topics that would upset CCP leaders. Self-censorship meant that journalists were unable to produce controversial stories that captured consumer interest. In a media environment with intense competition from BBC, Al Jazeera, and other global media outlets, the Chinese struggled to compete for viewers.12
Recognizing the shortcomings of their media strategy, Chinese media outlets modernized their approach by embracing social media, hiring experienced foreign journalists, and signing content-sharing partnerships with leading international media outlets.13 These changes to its media strategy more cleverly spread its “pro-China messaging” at a critical time for China. Under Xi Jinping, China set out to intensify Beijing’s global outreach. In one of his first speeches in 2013, Xi laid out a new vision for China as a “powerful international actor” that would spread the “Chinese dream” in a way that promoted “mutual benefit and win-win results.”14
To share the “Chinese dream” with other parts of the world, the CCP launched a global infrastructure and investment strategy in 2013, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Three years later in 2016, Beijing identified the Middle East as one of six economic corridors to advance two elements of BRI: its Silk Road Economic Belt and its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.15 The region therefore became a major target for China.
China’s New Target: The Middle East
China’s economic and political engagement in the Middle East aims to achieve two primary CCP goals: first, to secure its access to the region’s abundant energy resources and important trade routes and, second, to pull the region out of the U.S. orbit and into China’s sphere of influence.16 China is a relative newcomer to the Middle East; historically, the United States was the predominant power in the region. However, major shifts in U.S. foreign policy gradually eroded its standing over the years.
Initially, many Arab leaders were apprehensive about deepening U.S. engagement because they feared domestic backlash. Throughout the region’s history, regime survival hinged, in large part, on a leader’s ability to contain discontent within their populations. Arab leaders are therefore sensitive to any public reactions that could spark grassroots anti-regime movements. This fear eased following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The decisive U.S. military intervention underscored a firm U.S. commitment to regional security.17 For a time, Arab leaders accepted the U.S. security umbrella because it shored up regime stability and ushered in a period marked by relative peace and prosperity.
The post-September 11 era, however, changed this calculus. The implementation of President George W. Bush’s “freedom agenda” often resulted in electoral victories for Islamist parties, as seen with Hamas in Gaza in 2006 and across various countries during the 2011 Arab Spring. Islamist parties with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood won elections in Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.18 Regime change in some parts of the region and the outbreak of civil war in Syria, Libya, and Yemen worsened regional perceptions of U.S. leadership. From that point forward, Arab leaders that stayed in power no longer had confidence that U.S. financial and military backing guaranteed regime survival. Their populations believed that U.S. policies undermined Islamists in the region while promoting democracy on the surface.
Allegations of U.S. financial backing for Egyptian opposition groups provided evidence for this claim. Shortly after the removal of Egypt’s elected president Mohamed Morsi in 2013, Al Jazeera released documents obtained by the Investigative Report Program at the University of California at Berkeley. These documents detailed U.S. Department of State programs that financially sponsored civil society and anti-Morsi opposition groups in Egypt.19 Although policymakers in the United States called the evidence “inaccurate” and “disingenuous,” the story received an unprecedented level of attention on Al Jazeera’s website with more than 17,000 Facebook likes, 3,700 tweets, and 820 comments at the time of its publication in 2013.20
The U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State momentarily bolstered the legitimacy of U.S. security policies in the eyes of Arab leaders, but their populations grew tired of U.S. leadership. Critics argued that U.S. policy had at times undermined regional stability while proponents contended that the United States consistently sought to balance complex interests in the region, including counterterrorism and democracy promotion.21 Both perspectives argued, however, that U.S. foreign policy exhibited a bias in favor of Israel that overlooked Arab interests.22
In reality, U.S. policy in the aftermath of the Arab Spring focused on shoring up support among regional elites to avoid another round of uncertainty and instability. This strategy meant that the United States concerned itself less with public sentiment in regional countries and focused more on garnering elite support of U.S. interests.
The 2020 Abraham Accords are a clear reflection of this strategy. Many Arab elites viewed the Accords as a positive step towards regional stability and cooperation. However, major segments of the public did not share this sentiment, revealing a divide between elite and public opinion that now complicates U.S. relationships with Arab countries.23
Amidst this backdrop, China found fertile ground to extend its influence in the Middle East. Beijing now presents itself as a neutral power that cultivates economic partnerships without the political prerequisites that are often associated with U.S. engagement. This no-strings-attached approach is attractive to both Middle East leaders who want to diversify their economic and political alliances and Arab publics that are disenchanted with U.S. intervention.
As China increases its footprint in the Middle East, it not only aims to secure its energy and trade interests, but also hopes to present an alternative to U.S. hegemony. This nuanced engagement strategy underlines Beijing’s long-term vision of a multipolar world where it plays a central role. In a region as complex and volatile as the Middle East, China is taking a different approach than the United States. Instead of focusing purely on elite support, Beijing is attempting to win over both Arab leaders and their populations.
Softening Public Perceptions of China through Media
Since releasing its Arab Policy Paper in 2016, China has accelerated its engagement in the Arab world by integrating regional countries in its Belt and Road Initiative. This strategy emphasizes a 1+2+3 pattern by first advancing energy, then infrastructure, and finally technological cooperation to bolster regional development while enhancing China’s influence.24 Economic engagement is paired with media outreach. Mirroring its Southeast Asian charm offensive, China utilizes media to soften its image in the Middle East, targeting countries central to its investment strategy such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These nations are pivotal due to their economic significance and the influence of their media outlets, such as Egypt’s entertainment industry and the various news platforms owned by Gulf States.
To maximize the effectiveness of Chinese media engagement, Beijing has cultivated close relationships with local media outlets over the course of six Chinese-Arab media cooperation conferences.25 The goal of these conferences, from China’s perspective, is to align Arab media narratives with Beijing’s interests.
China employs a dual approach to spread its pro-China message. Beijing launched Arabic language services for major state media outlets like CGTN, People’s Daily, and Xinhua. These outlets offer a mix of China-centric messages that highlight Chinese culture, BRI, and regional stories that follow the political news cycle in the Middle East.26 News stories reach a wide array of audiences. On Facebook, CGTN Arabic boasts over 15 million followers, Xinhua 97 million, and the Arabic edition of People’s Daily 5.1 million followers. Messages are tailored to fit the audience, but all news stories touch on negative Western engagement juxtaposed with positive reporting on China.27 Indirectly, Beijing engages in content-sharing and co-productions with Arab media, leveraging appearances by Chinese diplomats and local proxies to amplify its narrative.28 Xinhua, for example, signed media cooperation agreements with Qatar-owned Al Jazeera, Muscat Media Group (Times of Oman and Al Shabiba), and Daily News Egypt.29 Xinhua also signed another agreement with the Emirates news agency and set up offices in the UAE alongside China Media Group.30 Joint partnerships between Xinhua and other Arab state media outlets are common tactics for China as it puts Chinese outlets on the radar of Arab editors and publishers.31 Many of these articles are written by a mix of Arabic-speaking Chinese journalists and local Arab journalists.32
While direct causality is complex, there’s a notable correlation between China’s intensified media engagement and increased trade, military purchases, and pro-China voting patterns at the United Nations (UN).
In 2020, China surpassed the United States as the Middle East region’s top trading partner. China-MENA trade was $132.5 billion USD larger than U.S.-MENA trade, a gap that has grown over the years.33 Media engagement has supported these efforts. In 2017, for example, an Abu Dhabi-based Arabic TV channel launched a series of Chinese entertainment and cultural programs that focused on the history of the Silk Road trade and China’s modernization.34 The message embedded in these programs is subtle, but unmistakable: trade with China respects tradition, but also brings prosperity, innovation, and modernization.
Beijing is also making strategic investments across the region with key U.S. partners. In May 2023, the South China Morning Post reported that Saudi Arabia and Egypt were in advanced talks with Chinese defense companies for air defense systems, reconnaissance drones, and their J-10 Vigorous Dragon multirole combat fighter jet.35 These discussions are part of a larger push by China to encourage Arab countries to decrease their dependence on U.S. systems. China has been relatively successful in that endeavor. According to a top U.S. military official, Chinese arms sales to the Middle East have increased by 80 percent. Most weapon systems sold to the region include small arms such as drones and UAVs. Even though there is increased interest in higher-end strategic weapons, the United States still dominates the market.36 To increase buyer interest, Chinese defense manufacturers are displaying new equipment at defense expositions hosted in the Middle East, notably and recently at the World Defense Show hosted in Riyadh in February 2024. Media coverage is extensive during these events, giving China an opportunity to outshine the competition on the world stage.37
At the UN, Arab countries with high levels of Chinese commercial and media engagement are defending China. Following the release of a 2022 UN report condemning China’s repressive policies in Xinjiang province, 14 Arab countries released a joint statement that called on countries to stop interfering in “China’s domestic affairs.”38 Shortly after the release of this statement, China secured enough votes to stop the debate on Xinjiang at the UN Human Rights Council. Many of these votes were from Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East that enjoy high rates of investment and media engagement by China.39 Arab elite support of China on Xinjiang is largely thanks to years of targeted media campaigns to obscure the Uyghur genocide and link it to “anti-terrorism work.”40 Beijing invites journalists and senior editors from across the region on official tours of the Uyghur region, with many quoted by official Chinese media praising Beijing’s policies.41
China’s adept use of media in the Arab world shores up its “discourse power” in the Middle East, but influence is difficult to measure. For the Arab world to recognize China as a formidable global leader, China understands it must not only advocate, but also visibly practice this leadership on the world stage. Through media, China amplifies its achievements and perspectives using significant geopolitical events to shape the narrative in its own favor. The conflict between Israel and Hamas presented China with the perfect moment to illustrate its potential role in global governance and peacemaking in the Middle East.
The Ways and Means of China’s Media Strategy in the Israel-Hamas War
Palestinian nationalism remains an important topic for Arab elites and the populations living in the region. According to a 2022 public opinion poll conducted by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies in Doha, 76 percent of respondents across 14 Arab countries agreed that Palestinian nationalism concerns all Arabs, and not the Palestinians alone.42 Long-standing U.S. support of Israel reinforces negative perceptions of the United States in the Arab world. China, meanwhile, cultivated relationships with both the Palestinian Authority and Israel, though historically its stance tends to lean toward the Palestinians.
China has seized on the war in Gaza as an opportunity to bolster its regional image. Beijing is conducting a targeted media campaign on the war in Gaza that presents Beijing as a better alternative to the United States. The goal is to turn Arab public opinion against the United States in a way that forces Arab political elites to fundamentally re-evaluate their relationships with the United States and China.
To present itself as a more responsible great power compared to the United States, Beijing’s social media, TV coverage, and articles in Arabic, English, and Chinese portray Beijing’s engagement in a positive light while criticizing Washington’s engagement in the war in Gaza by amplifying three CCP points of propaganda: U.S. interventionism, U.S. hypocrisy on human rights, and the failure of U.S. Middle East policy.
CCP Message #1: The United States is an Interventionist Global Power
Four days after the October 7, 2023 attacks, coverage from China’s Global Times called out the United States for its “biased” support of Israel stating that “the U.S. is stoking the fire,” and that the provision of military aid to Israel is “another reminder that the U.S. military-industrial complex stands to gain the most again from a Middle East conflict, like it did in Ukraine and other regional instabilities in the past.”43 Global Times cartoons in Figure 1 and Figure 2 reinforced another key message by China: that U.S. involvement in Gaza seeks to uphold American hegemony. This rhetoric feeds into negative Arab perceptions of U.S. engagement in the Middle East over the last ten years.44
China’s criticism of the U.S. intervention in Iraq mirrors its messaging on Gaza. On the 20th anniversary of the 2003 Iraq War, the Global Times published a piece that blamed Washington’s “military industrial complex” for profiting off “devastating disasters to countries in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan.”47 China is trying to tap into the same anger that turned Arab public opinion against the United States in Iraq after 2003. Beijing is also critical of Israel’s role in the war, claiming that its actions go “beyond self-defense” and institute the “collective punishment of the Palestinians,” a line that is echoed by Arab outlets across the region.48 Meanwhile, Chinese media and Arab media present the CCP as peacemakers that advocate for long-lasting prosperity in the region.
Coverage of an early Russian draft of UN Security Council Resolution 2712 on October 18, 2023, for example, demonized the United States for vetoing a resolution demanding an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in Gaza. They claimed that the ceasefire would have allowed greater access for UN agencies and partners to provide aid to the Palestinian people. The cartoon in Figure 3 published by CGTN Arabic on October 26, 2023 mocks the United States for its veto.49 Arab news coverage on the UN vote and a delegation of Arab-Islamic foreign ministers to Beijing depicted in Figure 4 also frequently highlighted China’s push for a ceasefire and presented an image of close collaboration between CCP and Arab leaders.50 China not only frames the United States as an interventionist power, but one that hypocritically advocates for a “human rights-based approach to U.S. foreign policy.”53
CCP Message #2: The United States Pays Lip Service to Human Rights
Coverage of the war by CGTN Arabic and Xinhua overwhelmingly documents the humanitarian situation in Gaza. Reports and videos highlight CGTN reporters walking around destroyed areas of Gaza and interviewing distraught Palestinians. The outlet’s coverage of the war’s impact on the population is strategic. China’s reporting is an alternative to Western reporting on the war, which is criticized for portraying a “pro-Israel” narrative.54
China makes a point to show off the humanitarian aid it provides to Gaza. A video and series of pictures published by CGTN Arabic and Xinhua in December 2023 showcased several trucks loaded with humanitarian supplies from China en route to the Gaza Strip via Egypt as seen in Figure 5.55 Press coverage of its humanitarian efforts combined with its targeted reporting on the ground allows China to present itself as an advocate for human rights.
At the same time, China blasts the United States for what China claims is a “double standard and hypocrisy” on human rights, depicted in Figure 6.58 In an article published one week after the UN vote on October 26, 2023, a journalist for the China Daily claimed that, “Western politicians who didn’t throw away any opportunity to accuse other countries of committing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, suddenly don’t know how to describe the slaughtering of thousands of innocent civilians despite the tragedy being played out in front of media cameras.”59 Criticism of the U.S. “double standard” on human rights is discussed at length in Arab media.
The Khaleeji Times, Sky News Arabia, and Al Jazeera all published articles that argued that the U.S. rushed to accuse Russia of committing war crimes, violating Ukrainian human rights, and ignoring international law, but turned a blind eye to Israeli violations of laws and standards in the Gaza strip.60 By closely aligning its messaging on human rights with Arab talking points, China hopes to gain the perceived moral high ground with Arab countries and their populations.
CCP Message #3: The U.S. “Greater Middle East Initiative” Failed
Underpinning the Chinese narrative is the message that U.S. foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict embodies the strategic failure of the U.S. approach to the Middle East. The day after Hamas attacked Israel, the Global Times posted a cartoon that depicted a dove representing peace in the Middle East breaking free of a tattered American flag as shown in Figure 7. The post included a comment that stated, “the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a consequence of the [United States’] strategic failure in the Middle East resulting from its long-standing practice of favoring one-side (i.e. Israel).”61 It claimed that the United States’ “biased support exacerbates the situation, offering no help in reducing bloodshed, casualties, and preventing the conflict from escalating into a potential sixth Middle East war.”62 This post on X was a response to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s condemnation of the October 7 Hamas attacks in Israel.
Another post on CGTN Arabic, in Figure 8, reads, “the United States is siding with Israel at the expense of the legitimate interests of Palestinians.” The long article that the post references negatively frames the U.S. response since October 7, stating that, “in recent years, the United States repeatedly attacked China over the so-called ‘human rights of Muslims in China’s Xinjiang region’ and other issues, but now it turns a blind eye to the humanitarian catastrophe of the Muslim people in the Gaza Strip. The United States has once again confirmed that the so-called ‘rules-based’ international order is based only on America’s selfish interests.”65 Both posts reflect China’s perception of the United States as a failing global power that is declining because of what Beijing sees as the United States’ own policy contradictions.
Is China’s Media Strategy Working or Creating Challenges to Its “Win-Win” Formula?
One month before the October 7 attacks, the polling firm Arab Barometer surveyed Palestinians on the Arab-Israeli conflict. When asked their view on U.S. and China policy in addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict, most Palestinians rated both as “bad,” but more Palestinians believed China had better policies toward the conflict than the United States.66
Another public opinion survey conducted between December 12, 2023 and January 5, 2024 in 16 Arab countries found that 94 percent of participants considered the U.S. position on the war in Gaza as bad. Another 82 percent stated the U.S. position was very bad. By comparison, only 38 percent of respondents saw the Chinese position negatively, while 40 percent viewed China’s position as positive.67
Since January, Arab public opinion regarding the United States has worsened. In a June 2024 Arab Barometer report, five countries were surveyed to understand how the Arab world viewed the United States versus China in the wake of October 7. In all five countries—Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania and Morocco—at least half of the respondents said they held favorable views of China. Key U.S. allies like Jordan and Morocco reported a 15-point increase in favorability towards China. When asked about China’s protection of Palestinian rights, however, views were less favorable.68 What these findings suggest is that respondents are clearly dissatisfied with the United States but do not necessarily support China’s approach in Gaza. Even with public polling, it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of Chinese media engagement in the Middle East because influence is neither tangible, obvious, nor visible. What is clear, however, is that Chinese messaging on Gaza and the Middle East overall carries a moralistic tone.
Emotional rhetoric may resonate with the Arab public, but it is unclear whether Arab leaders will be convinced enough to lean towards Beijing over the United States. Transactional deal-making by Arab leaders in the past suggests that realpolitik may drive Arab state behavior more than ideological concerns. If this is the case, Chinese messaging on Gaza may have no effect on elite behavior. Stability drives Arab state behavior, which is why the United States still has a clear advantage over China.
Despite China’s buildup of its military, Beijing is not willing nor is it able to project hard power in the Middle East. The United States, meanwhile, has military assets across the region which it can use to defend its regional partners. While these assets may endear the United States to Arab elites, it also furthers anti-U.S. sentiment and drives more positive perceptions of China among domestic populations in the Middle East. Perhaps Beijing believes that winning the hearts and minds of the Arab public is key to preparing for greater engagement with the Middle East in the future.
Regardless of China’s endgame, critical regional events like October 7 present unique opportunities for Beijing to drive home a key message to Arab countries: that the United States is an interventionist global power that does not care about human rights and no longer has a Middle East strategy that advances the interests of regional countries. In the long term, Chinese media campaigns will reinforce anti-U.S. sentiment among Arab populations. If Arab leaders decide that Beijing should replace the United States as the leader of a new global order, this could have major strategic implications on U.S.-Sino competition. The Middle East is the crossroads of energy and trade and is home to key strategic military assets for the United States. More importantly, China’s overreliance on Middle East energy would be a significant vulnerability in the event of a war with the United States in Taiwan.
The United States must therefore remain engaged in the Middle East to prevent China from filling a leadership vacuum. Beijing’s efforts to emphasize U.S. hypocrisy on human rights and U.S. interventionism challenge America’s ability to project a positive image in the Arab world. The United States should therefore reassess how it communicates its policies and values abroad, ensuring its actions align with its messaging to avoid accusations of hypocrisy or double standards. The United States can also point to China’s horrible human rights record to emphasize Beijing’s hypocrisy. One prominent example is the plight of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. The United States must counteract China’s efforts to downplay its persecution of the Uyghurs in Middle East media by exposing the horrors of mass arbitrary detentions, forced labor, forced sterilization and abortion, sexual abuse, family separation, and cultural erasure.
The United States might also consider more transparent and engaged public diplomacy efforts in the Middle East to counteract negative perceptions and demonstrate its commitment to regional stability and prosperity. While these strategies might not significantly change Arab public perceptions of U.S. leadership, transparent, consistent, and clear articulations of U.S. strategy in the Middle East will undermine Chinese messaging and offer a more honest picture of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Ultimately, the United States must recognize the multifaceted nature of its competition with China, which extends beyond military and economic realms into the battle for hearts and minds.
Image: Flags of Palestine and China at Capital Airport Expwy, June 13, 2023. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Flags_of_Palestine_and_China_at_Capital_Airport_Expwy_(20230613071805).jpg, used under Wikimedia Commons.
[1] “Arab Youth Survey 2022,” ASDA’A BCW, https://arabyouthsurvey.com/en/.
[2] U.S. Department of State, “How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment” (Washington, DC, 2023, https://www.state.gov/gec-special-report-how-the-peoples-republic-of-china-seeks-to-reshape-the-global-information-environment/.
[3] Joshua Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, China’s Uneven Campaign to Influence Asia and the World, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 38.
[4] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 38.
[5] Kenton Thinbaut, “Chinese Discourse Power: Ambitions and Reality in the Digital Domain,” Atlantic Council, August 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Chinese-Discourse-Power-Ambitions-and-Reality-in-the-Digital-Domain.pdf.
[6] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 38.
[7] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 48.
[8] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 48.
[9] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 67.
[10] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 67.
[11] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 67.
[12] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 83.
[13] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 84.
[14] “The full text of Xi Jinping’s speech on August 19 was circulated online: Dare to catch, dare to regulate, and dare to show the sword when it comes to speech,” The China Daily, November 4, 2013, https://chinadigitaltimes.net/chinese/321001.html.
[15] Nicole Robinson, Why the U.S. Must Break China’s Emerging “String of Pearls” in the Arabian Gulf, Backgrounder No. 3792 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2023), 4, https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/why-the-us-must-break-chinas-emerging-string-pearls-the-arabian-gulf.
[16] Nicole Robinson, “Russia’s War in Ukraine Heats Up Great Power Competition in the Middle East and North Africa,” Security and Strategy 3 (Summer 2023), https://hamiltonian.alexanderhamiltonsociety.org/security-and-strategy/russias-war-on-ukraine-heats-up-great-power-competition-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/.
[17] Dina Esfandiary, “The Anxiety Effect: How 9/11 and its Aftermath Changed Gulf Arab States Relations with the U.S.,” International Crisis Group, September 15, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates-united-states-saudi-arabia.
[18] Marc Lynch, “In Uncharted Warters: Islamist Parties Beyond Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,” December 16, 2016, https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/12/16/in-uncharted-waters-islamist-parties-beyond-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-pub-66483.
[19] Emad Mekay, “Exclusive: US bankrolled anti-Morsi activists,” Al Jazeera, July 10, 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/7/10/exclusive-us-bankrolled-anti-morsi-activists.
[20] Robert Kennedy, “Critics denounce Al Jazeera exclusive,” Al Jazeera, July 13, 2013, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2013/7/13/critics-denounce-al-jazeera-exclusive.
[21] “Speaking of ‘Opportunity’… Sudani Presents His Vision for the Future of Iraqi-American relations,” trans. Nicole Robinson, Al Hurra, April 12, 2024, https://www.alhurra.com/iraq/2024/04/11/متحدثا-الفرصة-السوداني-يعرض-رؤيته-لمستقبل-العلاقات-العراقية-الأميركية.
[22] “American Support for Israel: Its Scale, its Objectives, and its Areas,” trans. Nicole Robinson, Al Jazeera, October 25, 2023, https://aja.me/sq2csi.
[23] Dylan Kassin and David Pollock, “Arab Public Opinion on Arab-Israeli Normalization and Abraham Accords,” The Washington Institute, July 15, 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/arab-public-opinion-arab-israeli-normalization-and-abraham-accords.
[24] Nicole Robinson, Why the U.S. Must Break China’s Emerging “String of Pearls.”
[25] “Forum on China-Arab broadcasting cooperation held in Hangzhou,” Xinhua, December 10, 2023, https://english.news.cn/20231210/e8987b3f9952451192b9ae5f49efbcb4/c.html.
[26] Shayan Talabany et al., How Not to Lose Friends and Influence in the Middle East: The Narratives Advancing Russia and China’s Soft Power (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2022), 35-36, https://www.institute.global/insights/geopolitics-and-security/how-not-lose-friends-and-influence-middle-east-narratives-advancing-russia-and-chinas-soft.
[27] Shaina Oppenheimer, “What do Chinese Media Outlets Say About the Middle East? Depends Which Language You’re Reading,” Haaretz, February 11, 2021, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2021-02-11/ty-article-magazine/.premium/what-does-chinese-media-say-about-the-mideast-depends-which-language-youre-reading/0000017f-e5cd-df5f-a17f-ffdf1b610000.
[28] Sarah Cook et al., Beijing’s Global Media Influence: Authoritarian Expansion and the Power of Democratic Resilience, (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2022), 6-9.
[29] “Xinhua, Al-Jazeera agree to enhance cooperation on think tanks, new media,” Xinhua, December 6, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-12/06/c_137655750.htm; “Daily News Egypt signs content, image sharing agreement with Xinhua,” Daily News Egypt, October 19, 2019, https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2019/10/19/daily-news-egypt-signs-content-images-sharing-agreement-with-xinhua/; Times News Service, “Muscat Media Group signs agreement with Xinhua News,” Times of Oman, August 27, 2019, https://timesofoman.com/article/79747.
[30] Binsal Abdulkader, “Chinese media to actively participate in 2nd Global Media Congress: Chinese Envoy,” Emirates News Agency-WAM, August 4, 2023, https://wam.ae/en/details/1395303184128; “WAM signs 5 cooperation agreements at Global Media Congress,” Emirates News Agency-WAM, November 17, 2022, https://wam.ae/en/details/1395303103123.
[31] Kurlantzick, Beijing’s Global Media Offensive, 183.
[32] Oppenheimer, “What Do Chinese Media Outlets Say About the Middle East?.”
[33] Robinson, “Russia’s War in Ukraine Heats Up Great Power Competition in the Middle East and North Africa.”
[34] “Quest Arabiya Celebrates Chinese New Year, Unveiling Fascinating Silk Road Line Up,” Image Nation Abu Dhabi, January 25, 2017, https://www.imagenationabudhabi.com/media-center/quest-arabiya-celebrates-chinese-new-year-unveiling-fascinating-silk-road-line-up/.
[35] “China in advanced negotiations for major arms deals with Egypt and Saudi Arabia,” The New Arab, May 25, 2023, https://www.newarab.com/news/china-advanced-talks-major-saudi-egypt-arms-deals.
[36] Peter W. Singer, “How China is winning the Middle East,” Defense One, January 19, 2024, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2024/01/how-china-winning-middle-east/393483/.
[37] “Top Chinese defense products displayed in Saudi Arabia,” The Global Times, February 6, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202402/1306807.shtml.
[38] Virginia Mangin, “Why Arab and African Countries stand with China at the UN,” Swissinfo, October 11, 2022, https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/why-arab-and-african-countries-stand-with-china-at-the-un/47961448.
[39] “Outrage as UN debate on China’s alleged Xinjiang abuses rejected,” Al Jazeera, October 7, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/un-human-rights-council-rejects-debate-on-treatment-of-uighurs.
[40] James Griffiths, “From cover-up to propaganda blitz: China’s attempts to control the narrative on Xinjiang,” CNN, April 17, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/16/china/beijing-xinjiang-uyghurs-propaganda-intl-hnk-dst/index.html.
[41] UHRP, “The Happiest Muslims in the World:” Disinformation, Propaganda, and the Uyghur Crisis, (Washington, DC, 2020), https://uhrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Disinformation_Propaganda_and_the_Uyghur_Crisis.pdf.
[42] Arab Public Opinion Index 2022, (Washington, DC: Arab Center, 2022), 19.
[43] “US’ biased stance risks undermining efforts to defuse Israel-Gaza tension,” Global Times, October 11, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202310/1299692.shtml; “GT Voice: Who stands to profit from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?,” Global Times, October 11, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202310/1299678.shtml.
{44] “GT Voice: Who stands to profit from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict?” Global Times, October 11, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202310/1299678.shtml.
[45] Liu Rui, “House of Hegemony Illustration,” Global Times, October 11, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202310/1299678.shtml.
[46] Liu Rui, “Warmonger vs Pacifist,” Global Times, November 23, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202311/1302433.shtml.
[47] Yang Sheng and Zhang Changyue, “Iraq War 20 years on: hegemony that threating world peace should be contained; US decision-makers ‘should be held accountable’” Global Times, March 20, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202303/1287584.shtml.
[48] “China: Israel’s attacks on Gaza exceed the limits of self-defense,” Sabq, October 15, 2023, https://sabq.org/world/uky2ict47; Mahmoud Al-Hanafi, “The danger of the West and Israel Diluting the right to self-defense,” Al Jazeera, November 13, 2023, https://aja.ws/mzigwt.
[49] “The Sole Negative Vote,” trans. Nicole Robinson, CGTN Arabic, October 26, 2023, https://twitter.com/cgtnarabic/status/1717586891980382240?s=42&t=gGIr6w3eng-FMDAFPITRIA.
[50] “An Arab-Islamic Ministerial Delegation in China: Beijing Calls for an End to Humanitarian Catastrophe in Gaza,” trans. Nicole Robinson, Al Jazeera, November 20, 2023, https://aja.ws/petpzt.
[51] “The Sole Negative Vote,” CGTN Arabic.
[52] “An Arab-Islamic Ministerial Delegation in China,” Al Jazeera.
[53] Antony J. Blinken, “Putting Human Rights at the Center of U.S. Foreign Policy,” U.S. Department of State, February 24, 2021, https://www.state.gov/putting-human-rights-at-the-center-of-u-s-foreign-policy/.
[54] Kamal Saleh, “How did the Palestinian Narrative Overcome the Pro-Israel Media of the West?,” trans. Nicole Robinson, Al Khaleej, October 28, 2023, https://alkhaleejonline.net/سياسة/كيف-تغلبت-السردية-الفلسطينية-على-إعلام-الغرب-المؤيد-لـإسرائيل؟.
[55] “China Provides a Batch of Humanitarian Aid to the Gaza Strip via Egypt,” trans. Nicole Robinson, CGTN Arabic, December 4, 2023, https://arabic.cgtn.com/news/2023-12-04/1731657820645060610/index.html; “Mideast in Pictures: Humanitarian aid from China reaches Gaza through Karem Shalom border crossing,” Xinhua, December 19, 2023, https://english.news.cn/20231219/6fda9469ce6d450dada3ee254d92ddba/c.html.
[56] Yasser Quidh, “A truck loaded with humanitarian aid supplies provided by China is seen on the Gaza side of the Kerem Shalom border crossing between Israel and the Gaza Strip,” Xinhua, December 17, 2023, https://english.news.cn/20231219/6fda9469ce6d450dada3ee254d92ddba/c.html.
[57] Lu Lingxing, political cartoon in “America’s Double Standards Aggravate Humanitarian Crisis” by Su Jingjing, People’s Daily Online, July 8, 2021, http://en.people.cn/n3/2021/0708/c98649-9869875.html.
[58] Jingjing, “America’s double standards aggravate humanitarian crisis.”
[59] Chen Weihua, “Double Standard and hypocrisy on full display in the Gaza Strip,” China Daily, October 27, 2023, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202310/27/WS653afd68a31090682a5eafd6.html.
[60] Nabil al-Jubail, English Translation: “Gaza Exposes Western Double Standards,” Al Jazeera, October 25, 2023, https://aja.me/dl7hlx; “Double Standards in Gaza,” trans. Nicole Robinson, Sky News Arabia, November 16, 2023, https://www.skynewsarabia.com/middle-east/1670610-ازدواجية-المعايير-غزة; Kamel Saleh and Taha Al-Ani, “Tactical or Transformative: What’s Behind Biden’s Changing Tone towards Israel’s War in Gaza?,” trans. Nicole Robinson, Al Khaleej, December 14, 2023, https://alkhaleejonline.net/سياسة/تكتيكي-أم-جذري-ما-وراء-تغير-نبرة-بايدن-تجاه-حرب-إسرائيل-على-غزة؟.
[61] “Comment,” Global Times via X, October 8, 2023, https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1710920295945826683?s=42&t=gGIr6w3eng-FMDAFPITRIA.
[62] “Comment,” Global Times via X.
[63] “Comment,” Global Times via X.
[64] “The Palestinian Issue: CGTN Arab Followers: US Biases towards Israel at the Expense of Legitimate Interest of Palestine,” trans. Nicole Robinson, CGTN, November 7, 2023, https://arabic.cgtn.com/news/2023-11-07/1721844416405270529/index.html.
[65] “The Palestinian Issue: CGTN Arab Followers: US Biases towards Israel at the Expense of Legitimate Interest of Palestine,” CGTN.
[66] Chelcey Adami, “Survey sheds light on Palestinian views ahead of Hamas attack on Israel,” Stanford Report, December 5, 2023, https://news.stanford.edu/report/2023/12/05/palestinians-views-oct-7/.
[67] Arab Public Opinion about Israel’s War on Gaza, (Washington, DC: The Arab Center, 2024, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/arab-public-opinion-about-israels-war-on-gaza/.
[68] Michael Robbins, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark Tessler, “America is Losing the Arab World and China Is Reaping the Benefits,” Foreign Affairs, June 11, 2024, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/america-losing-arab-world.
