“Who is happy about this?” Vladimir Putin asked the 2007 Munich Security Conference audience of world leaders. In this now-infamous tirade, Putin referenced “one state” which had superimposed its economic, political, cultural, and educational policies upon the world.[1] That one state was, of course, the United States. Fifteen years and three American presidential administrations later, the Kremlin’s messaging remains unchanged.
In 2007, Putin called for an overhaul of the international system, with Russia leading the charge. Multipolarity was the tacit proposal to counter the unchecked power of the unipolar world led by the United States and its Western allies. Today, Russia remains committed to proselytizing the international community about the horrors of unchecked American power. Yet in contrast to the Trump administration, which rang alarms over Russian competitive endeavors to restore its great power status, the Biden administration seeks more cooperation with Russia, a self-declared competitor of the United States.
In 2022, U.S. policymakers must understand that American attempts to develop a “stable, predictable relationship with Russia”—terminology championed by President Biden—are futile if Putin believes that Russia’s foreign policy interests would benefit more from unpredictable opportunism than from the constrictions of stability. While the Biden administration frames Russia as a potential cooperative partner, Russia’s leaders continue to perceive the United States as a competitor, making it likely they will exploit American concessions made in the name of stability and predictability. The White House should not expect attempts to incentivize stability and predictability to be reciprocated by the Russian government. Rather, it should expect upticks in opportunistic behavior from the Kremlin.
Competition with Russia: Trump versus Biden
President Trump’s Priorities
President Trump entertained but did not prioritize cooperation with Russia. In its 2017 National Security Strategy, the Trump administration identified Russia as a threatening resurgent great power and competitor. The 2017 strategy document outlined myriad specific threats from Russia, ranging from antithetical values to development of competitive weapons systems. Generally, the Trump administration recognized that foreign actors like Russia compete with the United States by exploiting the American government’s binary categorization of relationships through the conditions “at peace” or “at war.”[2] Despite this outlook, the White House maintained some hope to cooperate with Russia. President Trump commented early in his presidency, “Some say the Russians won’t be reasonable. I intend to find out.”[3] In contrast to President Biden, President Trump made no foreign policy gestures towards Russia on his first day in office.[4]
Following these relatively bleak prospects for cooperation, the Trump administration responded with action. On the world stage, America called out Russia as an aggressor. Sanctions were applied for human rights abuses, cyber-attacks, and election interference facilitated by the Russian government. In 2017, in addition to expanding Magnitsky Act sanctions on particular Russian individuals associated with human rights abuses and corruption, the Trump administration slapped sanctions on Russia (and Iran and North Korea) through the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.[5] Several years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Trump administration applied sanctions targeting the Russian government while providing military aid and selling military equipment to Ukraine.[6] The Trump administration additionally withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, citing Russian violations.[7]
Despite these rebukes, the Trump administration is commonly characterized as “soft” on the Russian government. President Trump’s meeting with Vladimir Putin in Helsinki, Finland in 2018 is among the most infamous examples, where Trump publicly professed that he trusted Putin’s word more than the U.S. intelligence apparatus.[8] Referencing such blunders, the Biden administration frames its foreign policy as a sharp break with the Trump administration, enshrined by Biden’s first address to the Department of State in February 2021.[9]
President Biden’s Priorities
The Biden administration plays good-cop, bad-cop with its messaging on Russia, identifying Russia as a competitor while using diplomatic platforms to emphasize cooperation. The March 2021 Interim National Security Guidance’s first few sentences identify Russia and China as threats. The document collectively characterizes a “growing rivalry” with China and Russia and notes Russia and China’s investment in means to “check U.S. strength.” The interim guidance addresses two core components of competition with Russia: first, Russia’s determination “to enhance its global influence and play a disruptive role on the world stage,” and second, the need for diplomatic engagement on arms control and nonproliferation efforts. The guidance most commonly portrays the Russian government’s foreign policy as destabilizing while portraying China as relatively assertive and threatening.
Notably, the Biden guidance specifically delineates the importance of cooperation with Russia while the Trump strategy emphasized competition. Each of the 2017 Trump administration’s National Security Strategy’s 25 references to Russia characterize it as a threatening competitor. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s interim guidance lauds its decision to renew the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia as a positive example of America reengaging the international system and establishing credibility.[10] It also notes the administration’s aim to engage in “meaningful dialogue” with Russia, a proposal absent from Trump’s National Security Strategy which called for America to engage Russia as a competitor. Despite critics calling the Trump administration “soft on Russia,” when comparing initial guiding strategy documents, the Biden administration’s tone is more optimistic towards cooperation.
President Biden’s remarks outside of the Interim National Security Guidance highlight cooperation. The Biden administration repeatedly broadcasts its aim to create a “stable, predictable relationship” with Russia.[11] U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in a public appearance with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, emphasized this hope while highlighting Biden’s promises to thwart Russian meddling attempts.[12] The Biden administration seeks to cooperate with Russia where possible while holding it accountable for transgressions against the U.S. government and Americans abroad.[13] On his first day in office, President Biden committed to extending New START until 2026, a proposal warmly received by the Russian government. Yet he also publicly labeled Russian President Vladimir Putin a “killer” early in his administration, possibly demonstrating the administration’s aim to be both resolute and engaged with Russia. Blinken has credited Biden with following through with his commitment: “if Russia acts aggressively against us, our partners, our allies, we’ll respond…in both word and deed – not for purposes of escalation, not to seek conflict, but to defend our interests.”[14]
Michael Kimmage, Professor of History and Department Chair at the Catholic University of America, notes that the Biden administration will likely take a more ideological approach to engagement with Russia than did the Trump administration. It has been projected this approach will affect geopolitically-sensitive countries like Ukraine or Georgia, which seek more Western integration. Experts like Pavel Koshkin of the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences have suggested that the Biden administration may be more likely to achieve stability and predictability in U.S.-Russian relations because there will be continuity with the Obama administration.[15] The “predictability” endeavor would be facilitated by the Russian government’s eight years of practice with the Obama administration, given similar priorities and crossover among foreign policy leadership.
Consistent policy priorities for the Biden administration have included extending New START and punishing Russia’s interference in American elections. In the president’s first foreign policy speech in February, he addressed four general aspects of U.S.-Russia relations: the Russian government’s attempt to “damage and disrupt” democracy; extending New START; raising costs for interference with elections, cyberattacks, and poisoning of Russian citizens; and calling on the Russian government to release imprisoned Russian opposition figure Alexei Navalny.[16] These calls were reemphasized during Biden’s press conference after the June Biden-Putin Summit, adding freedom of press to the list of concerns.[17]During his first call with Vladimir Putin in April, Biden outlined the following priorities: continuation of New START and cooperation on arms control issues; the United States’ willingness to push back against Russian interference in American domestic politics; support for the sovereignty of Ukraine; and hope for a “stable and predictable relationship” with Russia.[18] The following month, Foreign Minister Lavrov expressed hope for areas of mutual cooperation with the United States, but most of these issues were missing from the Biden administration’s cooperation wishlist.[19]
Putin’s Opportunistic Exploitation of “Stability and Predictability”
Putin the Opportunist
To understand how the Kremlin may react to the Biden administration’s engagement, Putin’s decision-making calculus must be considered. Within the foreign policy community, there is ongoing debate about whether Vladimir Putin is a strategic mastermind or just a lucky opportunist. An increasingly common analogy is that Vladimir Putin plays “judo”, not “chess,” suggesting he is less of a strategist and more adept in disorienting his opponent in the moment.[20] If we accept that the Kremlin settles its foreign policy scores through judo matches, without mutual commitment to predictability and stability by the United States and Russia, then the Russian government should not be expected to constrict itself when it still views the United States as a competitor. The Russian government routinely exploits the gray zone of warfare and sows chaos within the status quo, so the incentive structure must change to make consistent cooperation more profitable than unpredictable opportunism. Even though diplomatic niceties have been exchanged about identifying areas of mutual cooperation between Russia and the United States, hopeful diplomatic gestures are Band-Aids on bullet wounds. Unilateral actions and statements by the United States should not be expected to produce lasting relational change while fundamental differences persist. The United States’ commitment to stability and predictability does not guarantee reciprocity from Russia.
Rewarding Tests
Less than one year into the Biden administration, Putin has wasted no time in testing America’s will to use the “sticks” in its toolbox. Through its recent, historic military build-up on the Ukrainian border, Russia is testing the Western reaction and commitment to Ukraine.[21] In April 2021, Russia mobilized 100,000 soldiers along the border of Ukraine, a larger mobilization than before Russia annexed Crimea in 2014.[22] Furthermore, in November 2021, satellite images suggest concerning Russian military buildup near the borders of Belarus and Ukraine.[23] These tests from the Kremlin are not unique to the Biden administration. Russia invaded Crimea during President Obama’s second presidential term. The Heritage Foundation observes that, “Since 2014, almost 5% of Ukraine’s landmass and more than half of its coastline have been illegally occupied by Russia.”[24] Given the observed continuity between the foreign policy approaches of the Obama and Biden administrations, the United States must be exceptionally attentive to recent foreign policy history when Russia begins to mobilize military units.
The United States must also note that Russian opportunism yields measurable rewards for Vladimir Putin. Despite domestic economic turmoil, Putin’s approval ratings soared from 61% to 89% one year after Russia invaded Ukraine and illegally annexed Crimea.[25] The shockwave continues; an April 2021 poll from the Levada Center, Russia’s independent polling institution, found overwhelming support for the annexation of Crimea among Russians who support Putin.[26] U.S. leaders must remember these domestic incentives when considering the likelihood that the Russian government will engage in good-faith foreign policy arrangements with the United States. Especially as Putin has secured his legal ability to govern until 2036 and his approval rating is dropping among young Russians, the U.S. must be mindful of Putin’s domestic incentives to maintain approval as he calculates Russia’s foreign policy.[27]
Implications
American Concessions
If the Biden administration cooperates with Russia and Russia views the United States as a competitor, then the United States may make unilateral concessions in hopes of demonstrating its good-faith commitment to instilling predictability and stability into U.S.-Russian relations. This strategy risks America making concessions that are then exploited by the Russian government for the Kremlin’s foreign policy purposes:
1. The first possible American concession is the Biden administration’s extension of the New START deal. The Brookings Institution categorized American commitment to extending this treaty until 2026 as “essentially accepting Putin’s offer from 2019.”[28] New START extension is a major talking point for the Russian foreign ministry. Some critics interpret the New START deal as disproportionately advantageous for Russia. For example, the treaty counterproductively permitted Russia’s stockpiling of nuclear weapons.[29] Given Russia’s frequent outspokenness towards Western agreements and conventions, it is worth considering the Kremlin’s investment. It is also worth considering how the United States withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty, for example, since Russia did not properly uphold its commitments within the treaty. President Biden’s rush to extend the New START treaty could be interpreted as a concession if enforcement mechanisms are not improved to ensure equal compliance by Russia.
2. The second action that could be perceived as an American concession is the Biden administration’s response to the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, which demonstrates a costly inconsistency within its approach towards the Russian government.[30] Where Biden and Blinken once renounced the pipeline, they then tacitly approved the project by choosing to waive sanctions ahead of Biden’s summit with Putin.[31] To Russia, Biden’s flip-flopping on completion of the pipeline may be interpreted as a concession towards Russia. It could also signal the United States abandoning its European allies’ battle to prevent further military aggression in vulnerable regions within the Russian gaze, such as Ukraine.
What has the American government achieved, after almost one year of cooperation? Despite reaching some settlements, Russian talking points continue to undermine the United States on the international stage. Following Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Secretary Antony Blinken’s February phone call, the Kremlin lambasted America on every topic introduced, even the New START Treaty.[32] Furthermore, following President Biden’s pledge to extend New START, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs dedicated a press release to dismantling American accusations that Russia had failed to uphold its arms control commitments.[33] The Russian press release also criticizes America’s claim that it upheld its own New START obligations. The Russian government continues to accuse the U.S. government of fabricating accusations against Russia by recently commenting, “We no longer pay attention to these completely unsubstantiated U.S. concoctions.” Such brazen attacks on American legitimacy raise the question of whether productive cooperation on arms control issues can exist if Russia accuses the United States of violations and belligerently refuses to acknowledge its own.[34] So far, U.S.-Russian cooperation on arms control, a stated national security priority of the Biden administration, does not bode well for future engagement.
Rhetoric and Brinkmanship
The Biden administration employs diplomacy and de-escalatory rhetoric in hopes of enticing reciprocity from the Putin regime. While diplomatic spats and pugnacious comments from Russian government officials may be considered the best-case scenario for U.S.-Russian relations in this period, the Biden administration’s diplomatic attempts may be overshadowed by risks and rebuffs. Unreciprocated diplomacy can pose threats and experiences limitations:
1. Perception of bark without bite may incentivize Russian brinkmanship. The Putin regime will quickly calibrate its foreign policy decisions based on perceived American concessions. Perceived concessions could include awarding Putin an in-person summit with the leader of the free world while America washes its hands of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, despite previously strong oppositional talking points. The Putin regime may internalize that America will permit certain distasteful foreign policy outbursts from Russia in the name of creating or preserving a “stable, predictable relationship” and look to diplomacy rather than military agitation for conflict resolution. Eastern Europe bears witness to Russia’s willingness to agitate. In July, Russian warplanes began simulating bombing campaigns against ships in the Black Sea, close to when the United States and allied countries undertook drills in the Black Sea.[35] “Unstable” and “unpredictable” are better terms to describe U.S.-Russian conflict zones.
2. American messaging about stability does not translate into Russia’s understanding of American intentions, nor is it reciprocated. The U.S. government should remember when charting a new strategy for competing with Russia that its actions, however well-intentioned, will be twisted into anti-American propaganda in Russia whenever convenient. Putin’s bellicose press conference following his summit with Biden demonstrates this consistency, even though Biden described that same meeting as “positive, good.”[36]
Ultimately, “stability and predictability” will be defined differently by both countries. There is a chasm between what American Democrats would call “pro-Russia” and what Putin would consider “pro-Russia,” exemplified by how Biden critiqued Trump’s purported coziness with the Russian dictator while Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov described the early Trump administration as “anti-Russia, anti-diplomatic.”[37] The Kremlin seeks to internalize and disseminate anti-Western talking points while portraying itself as a “besieged fortress” defending unchecked hegemony. This “rally around the flag” tactic can be used to rally domestic support through demonization of an external foe.
The Arctic region is an example of the two nations’ divergence in perception. Stability in the Arctic region looks different to the United States and to Russia. The United States recently supported Russia’s ascension to rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council. It then proceeded to rally members in opposition of Russian plans for monitoring the Northern Sea Route.[38] Such efforts will not be perceived by Russia as cooperation or stability but rather competition and destabilizing behavior in a geopolitically significant region. Russia will continue to view the United States as a competitor. The United States must be wary that giving the Russian government an inch in good faith can mean Russia takes a mile in bad faith.
3. Despite American cooperation and concessions, Russia continues aggressive rhetoric. The Russian government’s anti-American diatribes continue, despite impending victories for the Kremlin such as Nord Stream 2 and New START. For example, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Twitter account used the Biden administration’s refusal to rejoin the Open Skies Treaty as an opportunity to discredit the United States and justify Russia’s own violations of the treaty.[39] The Foreign Ministry likened the Biden administration to its predecessor in terms of recklessness and agitation, where previously the Russian government had framed Biden’s actions as a welcomed departure from the Trump administration.[40] Similarly, the Kremlin continues to critique the United States for not signing onto the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.[41]Russia also persists in chastising the United States for the destabilization of Syria.[42] Recently, Russia called defense cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom “hostile” and destabilizing.[43] Russia continues to engage in the same tit-for-tat diplomacy it employed during the Obama administration, such as denying U.S. officials entry in retaliation against sanctions. Russia is ready to cooperate on its terms.[44]
Russia’s rhetoric matters. It may be toothless, but it can also indicate willingness to escalate conflict, fostering instability and unpredictability. Political scientist Maria Snegovaya observed how higher oil revenues increased vitriolic Russian foreign policy rhetoric, demonstrating how internal strength can spur Russian aggression.[45] Conversely, the Russian government also takes foreign policy risks in positions of weakness, such as low approval ratings or poor economic performance at home. Russia’s willingness to aggress—when it is strong and looking to demonstrate strength and achieve goals or when it is weak and looking to bolster domestic strength —should raise concern given its recent celeritous mobilization in Ukraine.
Russia continues to consider the United States a competitor and undermine it internationally. Regardless of foreign policy concessions made by Biden, Russia’s Foreign Ministry will keep making statements like it did in March when American sanctions were imposed on Russian officials: “Having become enmeshed in its own domestic problems, the White House is again trying to cultivate the image of an external enemy. We have repeatedly commented on this U.S. policy which lacks logic and common sense. It is increasingly aggravating bilateral relations that Washington has already brought to a complete halt.”[46] The same statement also focused on American failures in other areas, observing, “As a serial violator of international treaties and agreements on arms control and the non-proliferation of weapons, Washington is, by definition, deprived of the moral right to ‘lecture’ others.”[47] Russia does not appear ready to cooperate on the Biden administration’s terms to produce stability and predictability when it perceives advantages from propagandizing instead.
Considering Other Perspectives
Some analysts, such as Angela Stent of The Brookings Institution, would suggest the Biden administration is achieving its goal towards Russia of fostering stability and predictability. According to Stent, the Biden administration has been quelling threatening outbursts from Russia, allowing American foreign policy to focus on the China threat.[48] Stent considered the June 2021 Biden-Putin summit to be a productive base for future negotiations, but she admits that time will test the fortitude of that base. Lessons from 2021 suggest that Putin will continue to test boundaries, and while the Kremlin may agree to proposals such as renewing New START, it has not provided fresh indicators that Russia will abide in any better faith.
Another argument in support of the Biden administration’s approach might note that some “concessions” to Russia must be made to repair relationships with strategic European allies to increase deterrence against Russian aggression and bolster regional security. For example, Germany expressed strong distaste for the previous administration’s alleged disengagement with and disrespect of Germany, so permitting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline’s completion may be understood as a goodwill gesture towards Germany more than Russia. Certainly, evenhanded analysis must consider the Biden administration’s international strategy beyond just Russia. However, enabling long term Russian influence over American allies by further regulating energy flows throughout Europe suggests that the concession may be weighted more heavily towards Russia.
There is no blueprint for engaging a relatively unstable, unpredictable competitor like Russia. Cooperative victories should be acknowledged when they occur. However, creating the illusion of cooperation while serious competition exists is not strategically beneficial for the United States in projecting strength and checking undesirable Russian foreign policy. If the Kremlin continues to issue threats without perceiving American willingness to fortify its words with action, then it seems unpropitious that selectively cooperating with Russia while dancing around sensitive, long term policy issues like Nord Stream 2 will produce tangible benefits for American foreign policy interests and our allies.
Conclusion
U.S. policymakers must understand that the U.S. government’s fresh attempts to develop a “stable, predictable relationship with Russia” set the stage for risky Russian opportunism when Russia is not similarly committed to these American goals. Over the past year, American leadership has changed, but Russian foreign policy towards the U.S. remains the same. Looking at 2021, it appears doubtful that Russian foreign policy is metamorphosing into stability and predictability. The White House should not quixotically expect Russia to trade in the competitive Munich Security Conference talking points for American language emphasizing stability and predictability anytime soon.
At the time of publication, Thea Dunlevie served as Program Coordinator in The Heritage Foundation Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom within the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy. There, she supported programming, research, writing, and external engagement regarding the US-UK Special Relationship, transatlantic relations, international organizations, international law, and public diplomacy. She was a fellow in the 2020-2021 Security and Strategy Seminar Russia track.
_________________
Image: Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in Geneva, 16 June 2021, from kremlin.ru. Retrieved from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Joe_Biden_and_Vladimir_Putin_in_Geneva,_16_June_2021_(04).jpg, used under Wikimedia Commons.
[1] Vladimir Putin, “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy,” President of Russia website, 10 February 2007, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034.
[2] “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” The White House, December 2017, 24, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf, 8, 14, 25-26. 28.
[3] Donald Trump, “Transcript: Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Speech,” New York Times, 27 April 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html.
[4] Katie Reilly, “Here’s Everything Donald Trump Did During His First Days as President,” Time, 21 January 2017, https://time.com/4641565/donald-trump-president-first-day/.
[5] Alina Polyakova and Filippos Letsas, “On the Record: The U.S. Administration’s Actions on Russia,” Brookings Institution, 31 December 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/09/25/on-the-record-the-u-s-administrations-actions-on-russia/.
[6] Luis Martinez, Conor Finnegan, and Elizabeth McLaughlin, “Trump admin approves new sale of anti-tank weapons to Ukraine,” ABC News, 1 October 2019,
[7] Ryan Browne, “US formally withdraws from Open Skies Treaty that bolstered European security,” CNN, 22 November 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/22/politics/us-withdrawal-open-skies/index.html.
[8] Franco Ordonez, “Biden Wants A ‘Stable, Predictable’ Relationship With Russia. That’s Complicated,” NPR, 21 May 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/05/21/999196021/biden-wants-a-stable-predictable-relationship-with-russia-thats-complicated.
[9] Joseph R. Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World,” The White House, 4 February 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/; Steven Pifer, “Joe Biden’s ‘killer’ comment: Undiplomatic, but the end of US-Russia relations?,” Brookings Institution, 2 April 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/04/02/joe-bidens-killer-comment-undiplomatic-but-the-end-of-us-russia-relations/.
[10] President Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Guidance: March 2021, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
[11] “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” The White House, 13 April 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/13/readout-of-president-joseph-r-biden-jr-call-with-president-vladimir-putin-of-russia-4-13/.
[12] Anthony J. Blinken and Sergey Lavrov, “Secretary Antony J. Blinken and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov Before Their Meeting,” U.S. Department of State, 19 May 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-antony-j-blinken-and-russian-foreign-minister-sergey-lavrov-before-their-meeting/.
[13] Ned Price, “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov,” U.S. Department of State, 12 May 2021, https://www.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-russian-foreign-minister-lavrov-2/.
[14] Steven Pifer, “Joe Biden’s ‘killer’ comment.”
[15] Michael Kimmage, Pavel Koshkin, and Victoria Zhuravleva, “U.S.-Russia Relations under the Biden Administration | An Expert Analysis,” The Wilson Center, 11 December 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-russia-relations-under-biden-administration-expert-analysis.
[16] Biden, “Remarks by President Biden on America’s Place in the World.”
[17] Joseph R. Biden, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference,” The White House, 16 June 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/06/16/remarks-by-president-biden-in-press-conference-4/.
[18] “Readout of President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. Call with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” The White House.
[19] Sergey Lavrov, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s press point following talks with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Reykjavik, 19 May 2021,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Government, 20 May 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4738018.
[20] Angela Stent, “Putin Plays Judo, Not Chess,” Wall Street Journal, 8 August 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/putin-plays-judo-not-chess-11565302039.
[21] Amy Mackinnon, Jack Detsch, and Robbie Gramer, “Russia’s Buildup Near Ukraine Puts Team Biden on Edge,” Foreign Policy, 2 April 2021 https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/02/russia-ukraine-military-biden/.
[22] “OFFICIAL: Russian military build-up near Ukraine numbers more than 100,000 troops, EU says,” Reuters, 19 April 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russian-military-build-up-near-ukraine-numbers-more-than-150000-troops-eus-2021-04-19/.
[23] Betsy Woodruff Swan and Paul McLeary, “Satellite images show new Russian military buildup near Ukraine,” Politico, 1 November 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/01/satellite-russia-ukraine-military-518337.
[24] Luke Coffey, “Russia Testing U.S. on Ukraine; Biden Administration Must Respond,” The Heritage Foundation, 16 April 2021, https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/russia-testing-us-ukraine-biden-administration-must-respond.
[25] Mamuka Tsereteli and James Jay Carafano, “Putin Threatens Ukraine—Here’s the Danger and What U.S., Allies Should Do About It,” American Foreign Policy Council and The Heritage Foundation, 14 April 2021, https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/putin-threatens-ukraine-heres-the-danger-and-what-us-allies-should-do-about-it.
[26] “Most Russians Support Annexation of Crimea – Poll,” Moscow Times, 26 April 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/04/26/most-russians-support-annexation-of-crimea-poll-a73741.
[27] Tom Balmforth, “Putin’s approval rating holds steady despite Navalny crackdown: poll,” Reuters, 4 February 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-politics-navalny-idUSKBN2A429G and “Russia’s Putin wins referendum on constitutional reforms,” DW, 2 July 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/russias-putin-wins-referendum-on-constitutional-reforms/a-54018337.
[28] Pifer, “Joe Biden’s ‘killer’ comment.”
[29] Patty-Jane Geller, “New START: The U.S. Should Not Extend the Dangerously Flawed Treaty for Five More Years,” The Heritage Foundation, 5 March 2020, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/new-start-the-us-should-not-extend-the-dangerously-flawed-treaty-five-more-years.
[30] Katie Tubb and Daniel Kochis, “Biden’s Hypocrisy on Keystone XL vs. Nord Stream 2 Pipelines,” The Heritage Foundation, 25 May 2021, https://www.heritage.org/energy-economics/commentary/bidens-hypocrisy-keystone-xl-vs-nord-stream-2-pipelines.
[31] “Nord Stream 2 sanctions would be ‘counter-productive’ for European ties – Biden,” Reuters, 25 May 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/nord-stream-2-sanctions-would-be-counter-productive-european-ties-biden-2021-05-26/.
[32] “Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s telephone conversation with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 4 February 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4552574 and “Press release on the future of New START,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 20 January 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/ /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4529343.
[33] “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on the US State Department’s report 2021 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 21 April 2020, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4697720.
[34] “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova.”
[35] Ryan Pickrell, “Russian warplanes have been practicing bombing enemy ships in the Black Sea, where the US and Ukraine are leading a large military exercise,” Business Insider, 5 July 2021, https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-warplanes-have-been-practicing-bombing-ships-in-black-sea-2021-7 and Tom O’Connor, “U.S., Allies Vow to Continue Black Sea Military Drills, Russia Sends Warplanes to Defend Borders,” Newsweek, 7 July 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/us-allies-vow-continue-black-sea-military-drills-russia-sends-warplanes-defend-borders-1607615.
[36] Biden, “Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference.”
[37] Lavrov, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s press point.”
[38] Matthew Lee, “US, Russia at odds over military activity in the Arctic,” Associated Press, 20 May 2021, https://apnews.com/article/arctic-russia-europe-environment-and-nature-government-and-politics-c97ac521407b897b70c72a62afee4f29.
[39] Tweet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Official Account), 29 May 2021, https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1398613923469877250.
[40] Lavrov, “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s press point.”
[41] Mikhail Ulyanov, Tweet, Russian Ministry Vienna, 25 May 2021, https://twitter.com/Amb_Ulyanov/status/1397323465158533120.
[42] Tweet, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Official Account), 26 May 2021, https://twitter.com/mfa_russia/status/1397562411088027650.
[43] “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on US and British plans to deploy land-based intermediate- and shorter-range missiles,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 5 April 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4664612.
[44] “Press release on a ban on entry of certain US citizens into the Russian Federation,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 16 April 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4689150.
[45] Maria Snegovaya, “What Factors Contribute to the Aggressive Foreign Policy of Russian Leaders?,” University of Maryland School of Public Policy, 18 January 2019, https://spp.umd.edu/research-impact/publications/what-factors-contribute-aggressive-foreign-policy-russian-leaders.
[46] “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on new US anti-Russia sanctions,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2 March 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4605069.
[47] “Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova on new US anti-Russia sanctions” and “Statement by the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation on actions of American internet monopolies,” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 27 January 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4543778.
[48] Angela Stent and Adrianna Pita, Brookings Institution, 17 June 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/what-did-the-biden-putin-summit-do-for-us-russian-relations/.