China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is known to be one of the country’s most ambitious projects of geopolitical influence. In 2022, however, BRI investment in sub-Saharan Africa dropped 55 percent to a new low. [1] Despite this window of opportunity for Western powers, trade between the United States and Africa remains only one-fifth the size of trade between China and Africa. [2] Nevertheless, as the United States looks to counter Chinese influence in the region, the drop in BRI investment still offers inroads for increased U.S. engagement. This engagement becomes even more important given that Africans are expected to make up a quarter of the world’s population by 2050, which will create new opportunities for international trade with and development on the continent as the world becomes increasingly interconnected. [3]
As the United States pursues increased collaboration with sub-Saharan Africa, however, it must demonstrate that it is concerned not only with its own geopolitical interests and countering China, but also with African development goals. By pursuing the renewal and modification of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), hosting annual Africa Leaders’ Summits, creating policies that promote improved governance in sub-Saharan Africa, and collaborating with stakeholders in African mineral markets, the United States and sub-Saharan African countries can work towards forward-looking partnerships.
The African Growth and Opportunity Act
First, to promote shared interests, the United States should renew and expand the AGOA. Launched in 2000, this program allows African countries to access U.S. markets tariff-free to promote trade and enjoys robust bipartisan support. [4] Different estimates report that AGOA created anywhere from 300,000 to 1.3 million jobs in Africa between 2000 and 2012 and has helped countries diversify their exports. [5] By renewing and expanding this key legislation, the United States can work to create strong trade relationships with sub-Saharan African countries.
Despite these strengths, AGOA suffers from low utilization, which is the rate at which African exports claim the AGOA trade preference. [6] Many countries have also not published national strategies on how they plan to utilize the program. [7] Furthermore, AGOA exports from most countries are oil and gas products, and certain countries – like South Africa, which accounted for over 56 percent of AGOA exports in 2021 – dominate the program. [8] AGOA has nonetheless benefited sub-Saharan African economies overall, but the policy needs provisions that encourage both geographic diversity and diversity of sectors involved. Reuters analysts note that the policy also needs to be updated to account for new technology and services that have developed in recent years. [9]
Another critique of AGOA comes from U.S. food and agricultural associations, which have opposed the renewal of AGOA due to punitive protectionist policies in South Africa that have hurt U.S. agricultural producers. [10] This reinforces the need for AGOA to focus on geographical diversification and the promotion of different strategies for different countries. If more countries participate in AGOA, U.S. agricultural producers will have a wider selection of sub-Saharan African countries to which they can export. In addition, the United States can consider implementing a reciprocal free trade agreement for countries or industries that have hurt U.S. producers the most, such as those in South Africa. [11]
Some countries that successfully utilize the AGOA still have certain problems to be addressed. One such country is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which had an AGOA utilization rate of 97.9 percent in 2021. [12] By exporting some of its extensive reserves of cobalt, which is used to make electric batteries, the DRC promotes both the growth of its own economy and U.S. renewable energy markets. [13] One obstacle, however, is that the DRC has faced backlash for its dangerous working conditions and reliance on child labor, which do not align with Western ethical standards. [14] A potential solution is to require and enforce certain labor standards for participating organizations to receive the AGOA trade preference, which would prevent firms with poor labor conditions from receiving benefits.
Renewing the AGOA will grant the United States greater access to lucrative commodities like rare earth metals and promote commercial activity in sub-Saharan Africa. A renewed AGOA should, however, include provisions that encourage economic and geographic diversification, as well as updated frameworks for new industries. It should also include a provision that pushes countries to implement better working conditions. Finally, the United States should work with AGOA countries to encourage them to develop national strategies, so that they can increase utilization rates.
Africa Leaders’ Summit and Future Bilateral Engagements
The 2022 Africa Leaders’ Summit marked a pivotal moment in a new era of collaboration between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa. At this summit, the United States made some of its biggest commitments to African development to date, including Biden’s verbal support of the African Union’s entry to the G20 and a $55 billion USD pledge to advance shared priorities under the African Union’s Agenda 2063. [15] By providing funding for health, infrastructure, agriculture, and security, this commitment will give the United States a significant stake in African development. [16]
At the Africa Leaders’ Summit, President Biden said that the United States is “leading a global effort to pursue equitable arrangements for global creditors to provide debt relief so nations can prioritize their people, not back-breaking debt payments.” [17] This statement offers an implicit critique of the BRI, which has left many countries in severe debt. Although China has traded over $19 trillion USD in goods between itself and BRI countries, BRI projects continually fail to live up to local communities’ needs, exacerbate environmental problems, and fuel local corruption. [18] This has made the BRI difficult to justify in recipient nations, which explains in part why China’s spending on it has decreased. These weaknesses present a diplomatic opportunity for the United States.
The BRI does remain popular among both the African populace and African governments, however. Fifty-two African countries have signed Memoranda of Understanding that formalize Chinese investment in those countries. [19] Public opinion on the project is also mostly positive; 62 percent of African respondents were satisfied with their participation in the BRI. [20] African respondents also shared criticisms, however, with 44 percent saying that they encountered difficulties in working with Chinese entities on BRI projects, remarking that the Chinese entities did not have enough knowledge about the communities that they are developing. [21]
The BRI is most successful in countries where there are ineffective governments and power vacuums. This presents an opportunity for the United States to work with African countries to bolster their democracies. To this end, President Biden announced the new African Democratic and Political Transition (ADAPT) initiative, which will invest $75 million USD into accountable governance, constitutional reform, voter registration, and other democratic goals. [22] Without consistent monitoring, however, it is likely that democratic backsliding will continue in many sub-Saharan African countries. West Africa deserves particular focus from the United States in this regard. Out of the five countries suspended by the African Union after their governments were overthrown by coups between 2020 and 2023, four of them – Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger – are in West Africa. [23] The ADAPT initiative should thus continue to be a focus as the United States seeks to counter democratic backsliding.
Unfortunately, at the 2022 Africa Leaders’ Summit, the United States missed an opportunity to promote younger leaders and try to work towards breaking cycles of corruption with African partners. [24] A potential solution to avoid this oversight in the future is reinvigorating the Obama Young African Leaders Initiative, which included fellowships and other educational summits to promote the next generation of African leaders. [25]
To best counter the BRI and track democracy promotion goals in Africa, the United States should set up annual Africa Leaders’ Summits. China, Russia, and Turkey all have predictable and regular summits with Africa; the United States should match this commitment and demonstrate that continued partnership is a top priority. [26] Continued investment in the ADAPT initiative is also important to not only help counter the BRI’s influence but also promote governance in regions that lack stability. With this two-pronged strategy, the United States will be able to conduct meaningful democratic work while monitoring progress towards its goals through annual summits.
The Minerals Security Partnership
Rare earth minerals, a group of 17 elements found naturally in the Earth’s crust, are crucial inputs for advanced technology like mobile phones and many weapons systems. The United States has disproportionately relied on China in the past to provide these minerals, but sub-Saharan Africa offers a strong alternative to dependence on China. One challenge of partnering with sub-Saharan African countries on rare earth minerals, however, is that many of these countries have accumulated international debt, in part due to the BRI.
Yet there is a potential solution to this problem. In 2022, an initiative called the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) was announced to bolster mineral supply chains. [27] Signatories include the United States, Australia, Canada, and the European Commission, which all pledged to reform supply chains and promote the transition to clean energy. [28] U.S. Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Jose Fernandez announced that the United States’s need for lithium is projected to increase 42 times its current level within the next few years, which positions certain African countries as essential partners for the United States. [29] By inviting sub-Saharan African countries to the MSP in concert with AGOA expansion and increased dialogue with regional partners, the United States can overcome this weakness.
A report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) both recommended that the United States consider inviting select African countries to join the MSP to promote U.S.-Africa collaboration towards the clean energy transition. [30] The CSIS analysis also argued that the United States should use economic diplomacy and trade agreements to become a more active participant in African mineral markets and the clean energy transition. This aligns with both the AGOA’s and the MSP’s goals and could also be incorporated into discussions at diplomatic meetings or summits.
A potential target for a U.S. partnership based on mining and renewable energy goals is Zambia, Africa’s second largest producer of copper. [33] China holds significant influence over Zambia; as a beneficiary of the BRI, Zambia defaulted on its debt due to Chinese loans. [34] With the help of financial leaders from around the world, Zambia recently reached a deal with China to restructure its debt over the next 20 years. [35] Since the election of the New Dawn government in 2021, however, presidential references to China as an important friend have decreased, and public opinion of China has declined. [36] This presents an opportunity for the United States to make inroads in the Zambian mining industry, as Zambia-China diplomacy is slightly less active than in previous administrations. To help Zambia avoid future debt, counter China, and advance American strategic goals, the United States should invest more into Zambian mining infrastructure.
According to Thomas Sheehy from the United States Institute of Peace, one of the biggest challenges of mining in Africa in general is a lack of infrastructure. [37] One new initiative that the United States is pursuing to combat this is the construction of the Lobito Corridor, which will connect mineral markets in both Zambia and the DRC to Western markets more easily. [38] This project will promote commercial activity in Central Africa, expand the clean energy market, and provide a U.S. counter to the infrastructure development created by BRI. [39]
By inviting mineral-rich African countries to the MSP, investing in sub-Saharan Africa’s rare earth minerals, supporting Zambian mining infrastructure, and promoting the construction of the Lobito Corridor, the United States can collaborate with sub-Saharan Africa towards developing cleaner energy sources.
Going Forward: Building a Robust U.S. Sub-Saharan Africa Strategy
Ultimately, the United States must pursue strategic goals with sub-Saharan Africa that not only counter China, but also help sub-Saharan African countries accomplish their own goals. Some African leaders interpreted the Africa Leaders’ Summit as solely a part of U.S. efforts in the great power competition. [40] Although it is important to establish the United States as an alternative to Chinese influence, U.S. strategy must consider African interests in order to be effective. African leaders are seeking partnerships that will accomplish their political and economic goals, not policies that seek to use African countries as pawns within the U.S.-China power struggle.
Additionally, the United States should ensure that these policies have accountability frameworks. Long patterns of political corruption in sub-Saharan Africa suggest that more accountability is needed for democratic governance initiatives. By engaging in policies that promote shared interests, political stability, and economic success, the United States can show Africa that it is committed to its success both within and independent of efforts to counter China. Since the BRI traps countries in debt and has often not respected local communities’ wishes, the United States has an opportunity to offer an alternative based on equitable diplomacy and fair economic partnerships.
By renewing and expanding AGOA, the United States can adapt to new industries and support the improvement of utilization rates. Hosting annual Africa Leaders’ Summits will foster a continuing dialogue on evolving objectives and offer an alternative to the BRI, in addition to providing an opportunity to track progress on democratic goals. Inviting mineral-rich African countries to the MSP will promote the clean energy transition and bolster technology and military advancement. Overall, these strategic goals will promote collaboration that is geopolitically relevant, forward-looking, and based on the solid foundation of existing U.S. Africa policy.
Grace Kurtz-Nelson ’25 serves as the Co-President of the AHS chapter at Duke University, where she is majoring in Public Policy and French.
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Notes:
[1] Robert Bociaga, “China’s Africa Belt and Road investment drops as West spends more,” Nikkei Asia, March 25, 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/China-s-Africa-Belt-and-Road-investment-drops-as-West-spends-more.
[2] Mark Kennedy, “Ten Reasons Why the US Should Renew AGOA,” Wilson Center, November 1, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/360deg-view-african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa.
[3] Kennedy, “Why the US Should Renew AGOA.”
[4] Claire Klobucista and Mariel Ferragamo, “AGOA: The U.S.-Africa Trade Program,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 4, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/agoa-us-africa-trade-program.
[5] Klobucista and Ferragamo, “AGOA.”
[6] “African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA): Program Usage, Trends, and Sectoral Highlights,” United States International Trade Commission, June 2023, 18, https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub5419.pdf.
[7] Witney Schneidman, Kate McNulty, and Natalie Dicharry, “How the Biden administration can make AGOA more effective,” Brookings Institution, November 15, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-the-biden-administration-can-make-agoa-more-effective/.
[8] Schneidman, McNulty, and Dicharry, “Make AGOA more effective.”
[9] Nellie Peyton, “The U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),” Reuters, November 1, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-african-growth-opportunity-act-agoa-2023-11-01/.
[10] Linda Ensor, “US food producers lobby against AGOA,” AGOA.info, November 30, 2013, https://agoa.info/news/article/5322-us-food-producers-lobby-against-agoa.html.
[11] Ensor, “US food producers lobby against AGOA.”
[12] “AGOA Program Usage, Trends, and Highlights,” United States International Trade Commission, 72.
[13] Daniel Runde and Sundar Ramanujam, “Beyond 2025: The Future of the African Growth and Opportunity Act,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 4, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/beyond-2025-future-african-growth-and-opportunity-act.
[14] Todd Frankel, “The Cobalt Pipeline,” The Washington Post, September 30, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/batteries/congo-cobalt-mining-for-lithium-ion-battery/.
[15] Matthew Duss and Gilles Yabi, “The Major Takeaways From the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit,” The Carnegie Endowment, December 21, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/12/21/major-takeaways-from-u.s.-africa-leaders-summit-pub-88691.
[16] Joe Biden, “Remarks by President Biden at the U.S.-Africa Summit Leaders Session on Partnering on the African Union’s Agenda 2063,” The White House, December 15, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/12/15/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-u-s-africa-summit-leaders-session-on-partnering-on-the-african-unions-agenda-2063/.
[17] Joe Biden, “Remarks on African Union’s Agenda 2063.”
[18] Tessa Wong, “Belt and Road Initiative: Is China’s trillion-dollar gamble worth it?,” BBC, October 17, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-67120726.
[19] Alex Stonor, “The Lobito Corridor: Washington’s Answer to Belt and Road in Africa,” Geopolitical Monitor, January 4, 2024, https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/the-lobito-corridor-washingtons-answer-to-belt-and-road-in-africa/.
[20] “Belt and Road Initiative: The View from Africa,” CMS Legal Services, 2021, https://cms.law/en/media/international/files/publications/publications/bri-view-from-africa?v=1.
[21] “Belt and Road Initiative,” 9.
[22] Joe Biden, “Remarks on African Union’s Agenda 2063.”
[23] Singumbe Muyeba and Abigail Kabandula, “‘Deadly Earnest and Serious’: Successes and missed opportunities at the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit,” University of Denver Institute for Comparative & Regional Studies, January 30, 2023, https://korbel.du.edu/regional-studies/news-events/all-articles/deadly-earnest-and-serious-successes-and-missed-opportunities-us-africa-leaders-summit.
[24] Muyeba and Kabandula, “Deadly Earnest and Serious.”
[25] U.S. Embassy in Eritrea, “Young African Leaders’ Initiative,” https://er.usembassy.gov/education-culture/young-african-leaders-initiative/.
[26] Muyeba and Kabandula, “Deadly Earnest and Serious.”
[27] “Minerals Security Partnership,” U.S. Department of State, 2023, https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership/.
[28] “Minerals Security Partnership,” U.S. Department of State.
[29] Lenin Ndebele, “Africa could rescue US as lithium demand projected to surge 42 times,” News24, February 8, 2023, https://www.news24.com/news24/africa/news/africa-could-rescue-us-as-lithium-demand-projected-to-surge-42-times-20230208.
[30] Gustavo Ferreira, Jamie Critelli, and Wayne Johnson, “The Future of Rare Earth Elements in Africa in the Midst of a Debt Crisis,” The Civil Affairs Association, August 15, 2020, https://www.civilaffairsassoc.org/post/the-future-of-rare-earth-elements-in-africa-in-the-midst-of-a-debt-crisis.
[31] Ferreira, Critelli, and Johnson, “Future of Rare Earth Elements.”
[32] Zainab Usman, et al., “How Can African Countries Participate in U.S. Clean Energy Supply Chains?” The Carnegie Endowment, 2023, 6, https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/10/02/how-can-african-countries-participate-in-u.s.-clean-energy-supply-chains-pub-90673.
[33] “Zambia,” Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, 2021, https://eiti.org/countries/zambia.
[34] Stephen Mulrenan, “Rising African debt causes Belt and Road dilemma for China,” International Bar Association, December 7, 2020, https://www.ibanet.org/article/9B15BDB5-5A6C-4428-8D50-2A08CA7D2BF7.
[35] Sylvie Corbet, “Debt-plagued Zambia reaches deal with China, other nations to rework $6.3B in loans, French say,” Associated Press, June 22, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/zambia-debt-restructuring-deal-china-a0d14e7af986e2f873555685cedb86b3.
[36] Edward Chibwili, “AD759: Perceptions of China’s influence on Zambia remain positive, though on the decline,” Afrobarometer, January 19, 2024, https://www.afrobarometer.org/publication/ad759-perceptions-of-chinas-influence-on-zambia-remain-positive-though-on-the-decline/.
[37] Thomas Sheehy, “Thomas Sheehy on U.S. Investment in Africa’s Critical Minerals Infrastructure,” United States Institute of Peace, February 22, 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/02/thomas-sheehy-us-investment-africas-critical-minerals-infrastructure.
[38] Stonor, “The Lobito Corridor.”
[39] Stonor, “The Lobito Corridor.”
[40] Muyeba; Kabandula, “Deadly Earnest and Serious.”
Image: “Tony Elumelu, Nigerian economist, philanthropist and founder of The Tony Elumelu Foundation, remarks at a reception for African innovators as part of the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. on December 12, 2022” by Ron Przysucha, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reception_for_African_Innovators_as_Part_of_the_U.S.-Africa_Leaders_Summit_(52560567420).jpg. This image is a work of a United States Department of State employee, taken or made as part of that person’s official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the image is in the public domain per 17 U.S.C. § 101 and § 105 and the Department Copyright Information.
