Many say “you can’t have your cake and eat it, too.” Yet nuclear fission mediates an unlikely union between climate action and economic development. With its ability to generate substantial energy with minimal fuel and low greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear energy is the foremost solution when it comes to fulfilling climate commitments across various geographical contexts. At the same time, many states struggle to independently pursue nuclear energy production because of high capital costs, which comprise at least 60 percent of nuclear plants’ levelized cost of electricity. [1] Eager nations must therefore collaborate with willing partners that are often larger and impose various conditions. Moreover, the intricate civilian nuclear fuel cycle also conceals proliferation risks that not all international safeguards fully address. How then can the United States address the efforts of foreign rivals to court nuclear partnerships with energy-hungry states while also protecting the decades-old international nonproliferation apparatus? The answer to this question lies in the United States’s ability to leverage and reinforce its present position as a nuclear technology leader through founding a nuclear alliance that advances robust trade under shared safeguards.
Cheap and Protectionless: The Danger of Chinese Partnerships
In recent years, China has intensified its efforts to build nuclear reactors both at home and abroad. Beijing currently operates 55 nuclear reactors, with 22 more under construction. [2] In 2021, it exported$293 million USD worth of nuclear reactors, reaching countries such as Pakistan, Nigeria, South Africa, and Malaysia. [3] Its Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with 13 nations additionally outline explicit contracts for nuclear plant construction and the export of nuclear items and services, a number surpassing the United States’s ‘123 Agreements,’ which facilitate nuclear cooperation on the basis of nonproliferation criteria, with its own partners. [4]
Although the United States maintains higher nuclear utilization than China, boasting 93 reactors and $338 million USD in exports,China’s expanding nuclear exports are slated to increase and align with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). [5-6] China’s 30 planned nuclear reactors in BRI countries across Asia, the Middle East, and Africa set to be constructed by 2030 may grant China coercive leverage over these countries. If, for example, a partner takes a dissenting view on issues important to China, Beijing will have the threat of suspending power generation in its policy toolkit. [7-8] Additionally, countries defaulting on Chinese loans could result in a ‘debt-for-equity swap,’ granting China control over strategic assets in recipient nations. [9] Ultimately, nuclear partnerships lay the groundwork for future trade opportunities and enable China to nurture BRICS, the economic bloc it leads as a rival to the U.S.-led Group of Seven (G7). This then paves the way for China to employ tactics akin to Russia’s ‘pipeline politics’ in Europe. [10]
China outstrips its nuclear export competitors in two key ways. Firstly, Chinese-owned nuclear giants China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) can build new plants at low cost, about one-third the price of U.S. and French projects. [11] China’s non-member status in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also enables it to generously finance its vertically integrated nuclear industry. [12] It has provided over 80 percent of the financing for its nuclear projects in Pakistan and recently agreed to finance 85 percent of two nuclear reactors in Argentina, though this latter agreement was scuttled as a result of the recently-elected President Javier Milei’s austerity measures. [13] This strong economic case, amid the recent financial and geopolitical complications of its French and Russian competitors, has enabled China to establish critical partnerships across the world. [14]
China’s lack of stringent regulation compared to the United States has also attracted nations interested in both civilian and military uses of nuclear power. While the United States’s 123 Agreements prohibit the construction of uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing facilities and mandate rigorous safeguards at each stage of the nuclear energy cycle, China’s regulations require the bare minimum of international safeguards against weaponization. [15] In the cases of Iran and Pakistan, China has lacked the resources to even enforce those safeguards, resulting in nuclear proliferation. [16] This poor regulatory track record makes Chinese partnership attractive to nations with weapons development on the agenda.
The United States has limited options to curb the efforts of such countries. Updating stringent international safeguards is easily resisted by Russia and China, which are both members of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). [17] Signing non-exclusive ‘soft’ Memoranda of Understanding with interested partners cannot prevent simultaneous dealings with other powers that are more willing to transfer sensitive nuclear items and services. As for punitive measures, the Clinton administration’s reluctance to increase sanctions against Pakistan and China in 1992 for fear of a wider diplomatic fallout prove their limited efficacy. [18]
Only 123 Agreements, wherein partner countries forswear enrichment capabilities, can facilitate the safe transfer of civilian nuclear technology. Even then, the United States’s reputation for reliability and other business advantages can only go so far in keeping candidate partners away from the attractively funded CNNC.
Strategic Recommendation: A Principled Nuclear Alliance
Facing an impasse with countries demanding enrichment and reprocessing capabilities lest they turn to Chinese alternatives, the United States relies solely on its intangible seal of approval derived from its considerable influence on the world stage. [19] The United States does not award partnerships lightly, and its cooperation sends a positive signal to other nations on the global nuclear market. To formalize and build on this ‘seal of approval,’ the United States should establish a nuclear sharing alliance: a hub for robust trade in nuclear energy with nonproliferation principles front and center.
The alliance would be based on shared adherence to the regulations outlined in the United States’s 123 Agreements, requiring membership in the IAEA and the adoption of the latest and most stringent safeguards. Countries joining this coalition will enter a 123-style agreement with all other members, and in doing so unlock additional benefits like priority access to export financing of U.S. nuclear infrastructure. This approach will allow states eager for nuclear energy to access not only U.S. nuclear expertise and technology but also the high quality exports of other nations in the coalition with expertise in the field, such as South Korea. [20]
An Admissions Policy for a U.S.-Led Nuclear Alliance
Central to this coalition is the question of admission, which must consider each country’s domestic and geopolitical situations. The United States must avoid giving its approval to countries with conditions that leave them beholden to U.S. rivals. Granting a nuclear knowledge sharing agreement to countries not materially suited for the adoption of civilian nuclear energy would also be counterproductive. Three core factors would thus comprise a framework for the United States to evaluate the suitability of its would-be nuclear partners: the effect of nuclear sharing on collective security, the candidate’s material and geographic position, and the candidate’s domestic policy environment.
Firstly and most crucially, foreign policy factors must prove that the country’s nuclear adoption will enhance, rather than jeopardize, collective security. Nuclear energy must help diversify the candidate’s energy mix, reducing its dependence on a single energy source and improving resilience against supply disruptions. States must also boast a combination of a proven commitment to international nonproliferation agreements, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and a stable diplomatic situation that presents no objection to nuclear integration. A country that does well here should not raise many hackles from surrounding countries with its nuclear energy program. Rather, it will gain from nuclear integration by moving toward energy independence.
Secondly, the candidate’s material situation must be favorable. This entails access to a stable uranium supply, either through active mining and exploration or long-term contracts with diversified sources, and both suitable land locations for nuclear facilities and deep geological repositories to ensure that nuclear energy is produced without threat to environment and public safety. Additionally, the candidate must commit to investing in a trained and skilled workforce to advance nuclear technology, alternative fuel cycles, and safety features. An outstanding candidate in this area would have ample domestic uranium deposits with active exploration and a strong scientific workforce backed by robust state investment.
Finally, the candidate must maintain a domestic policy environment conducive to responsible nuclear ownership. The significant life cycle costs of nuclear energy – including construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning – contribute to the overall cost-effectiveness of nuclear energy compared to other energy sources. The sustainability of nuclear projects does, however, require steady support from a politically stable government, public-private partnerships, and favorable public sentiment toward nuclear spending. The best-performing countries on this metric will boast a strong economic case, broad public support for nuclear energy, and even consultation with local communities.
These filtering conditions would enable the United States to quickly build a community of nations committed to secure and beneficial nuclear integration and cooperation, capitalizing on the U.S. ‘brand’ of nuclear technology and infrastructure to align the incentives of robust nonproliferation safeguards with increased collaboration.
Saudi Arabia: A Controversial Candidate Proves Indispensable
One potential candidate for U.S. nuclear investment is Saudi Arabia. The Saudi pursuit of nuclear energy is predicated on diversifying energy sources and reducing dependence on oil, thereby promoting energy security. The geopolitical implications of a potential Saudi nuclear partnership are significant, including threats to nonproliferation on one hand and preventing a Saudi-China nuclear agreement on the other.
Saudi Arabia’s insistence on obtaining the capacity to enrich domestic uranium and establish the entire nuclear fuel cycle, forbidden by the United States’s past 123 Agreements, raises questions. [21] Despite acceding to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1988 and thus being legally bound against pursuing nuclear weapons, the Saudi Crown Prince has voiced a desire to attain nuclear weapons if Iran develops them first. [22] Additionally, Saudi Arabia has been reluctant to ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, which aims to guarantee IAEA access for inspection of nuclear fuel sites. [23] The United States could therefore set a dangerous precedent by conceding on enrichment. Former Special Envoy to Iran Brian Hook stressed in a recent Senate hearing that such a move invites other countries to renegotiate their agreements. [24]
The United States cannot, however, simply refuse to cooperate with the Saudis, as the CNNC – alongside French, Russian, and South Korean nuclear corporations – has also set its sights on the contract to build the two initial nuclear power units in Saudi Arabia. [25] Losing the Saudi deal to regulatorily weak Chinese state-owned giants could undermine all nonproliferation efforts thus far. Saudi Arabia’s domestic policy and material factors also appear to make it a satisfactory nuclear partner. Whereas many developing countries struggle to redirect scarce government resources away from health, education, and other priorities toward subsidizing nuclear energy, the Saudis are committed to this spending. [26] In 2010, Riyadh established the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KACARE) aimed at fostering nuclear and renewable energy research initiatives to build human capital and local expertise. [27] In 2018, it announced plans to build two large nuclear power stations over the next 20 to 25 years at an estimated cost of $80 billion USD. [28] Moreover, substantial uranium deposits within Saudi Arabia’s Persian Gulf territory, with assessments in 2020 suggesting reserves potentially exceeding 90,000 tons, offer a tangible foundation for the kingdom’s nuclear energy ambitions. [29]
The case for not losing the Saudi deal becomes even stronger considering the broader context of U.S.-Saudi relations. Using the nuclear deal to entice Saudi Arabia toward normalized relations with Israel is far preferable to allowing deepened Saudi ties with China or even Saudi participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. [30] Saudi Arabia’s history of international collaboration also suggests that it would find a community of nuclear partnerships highly attractive. Saudi Arabia has signed nuclear energy capability development agreements with countries including France, South Korea, and Argentina. In fact, Argentina’s INVAP has been building a 30-kilowatt low power research reactor at the King Abdulaziz City for Science & Technology (KACST) in Riyadh since 2018. [31] None of these collaborations demonstrate the same proliferation risks as a potential deal with China would; Argentina’s envoy to the IAEA has, for example, stated that further safeguards will be required before the research reactor it is constructing at KACST can be fueled. [32] These factors indicate that Saudi pursuit of nuclear energy will enhance, rather than jeopardize, collective security. Nuclear energy will not only bolster Saudi Arabia’s energy security, but it will also provide mutual benefits through partnerships with the United States and its allies.
Conclusion
Intricate processes and strategic considerations characterize this global nuclear energy market. While nuclear energy promises to be a low-carbon alternative amid the pressing need to address climate change, the emergence of significant players like China that leverage nuclear exports for economic and diplomatic influence threatens nonproliferation abroad.
Given these dynamics, creating and leading a nuclear sharing community enables the United States to promote both robust nonproliferation safeguards and increased collaboration. As nations navigate the clean power transition, their choices carry significant diplomatic and energy-related consequences. By systematically evaluating countries for admission, the United States can lead a rapidly growing alliance of countries that adhere to robust regulations and participate in international nonproliferation bodies like the IAEA.
The path forward must balance the potential of nuclear energy for clean power and the geopolitical implications of nuclear collaborations. Envisioned to foster responsible and sustainable nuclear practices, a U.S.-led nuclear community mitigates the proliferation risks associated with nuclear energy adoption, ensuring a collective commitment to a cleaner, safer energy future.
David Goh ’25 is a member of the AHS chapter at Duke University, where he is majoring in Mathematics.
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Notes:
[1] “The New Economics of Nuclear Power,” World Nuclear Association, December 2005, https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1000/ML100050089.pdf.
[2] Sha Hua, “Atomic Power Is In Again—and China Has the Edge,” The Wall Street Journal, December 7, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/china/atomic-power-is-in-againand-china-has-the-edge-5f8a8b84.
[3] Datawheel, “Nuclear Reactors in China,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed January 15, 2024, https://oec.world/en.
[4] Alan Ahn, et al., “2023 Map: The World Wants Nuclear Energy. China and Russia Are Racing Ahead,” Third Way, accessed January 15, 2024, https://www.thirdway.org/memo/2023-map-the-world-wants-nuclear-energy-china-and-russia-are-racing-ahead.
[5] “Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) – U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),” U.S. Energy Information Administration, August 3, 2023, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=207&t=21.
[6] Datawheel, “Nuclear Reactors: Product Trade, Exporters and Importers,” The Observatory of Economic Complexity, accessed January 15, 2024, https://oec.world/en/profile/hs/nuclear-reactors.
[7] Lami Kim, “Nuclear Belt and Road and U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Cooperation.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, April 24, 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nuclear-belt-and-road-and-us-south-korea-nuclear-cooperation.
[8] Kim, “Nuclear Belt and Road and U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Cooperation.”
[9] Kim, “Nuclear Belt and Road and U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Cooperation.”
[10] Chen Bing-Ming, “China’s ‘Nuclear Dragon’ Goes Abroad: Exporting Nuclear Power Infrastructure through the Belt and Road Initiative,” Center for International Private Enterprise, May 18, 2021.
[11] Dan Murtaugh and Krystal Chia, “China’s Climate Goals Hinge on a $440 Billion Nuclear Buildout,” Bloomberg, November 2, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-11-02/china-climate-goals-hinge-on-440-billion-nuclear-power-plan-to-rival-u-s.
[12] Elaine Luria and Josh Freed, “The Global Nuclear Energy Market Is a Geopolitical Battleground,” Defense News, March 29, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2023/03/29/the-global-nuclear-energy-market-is-a-geopolitical-battleground/.
[13] Kim, “Nuclear Belt and Road and U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Cooperation.”
[14] Steve Thomas, “Why China’s Nuclear Exports May Struggle to Find a Market,” ChinaFile, May 13, 2016, https://www.chinafile.com/environment/why-chinas-nuclear-exports-may-struggle-find-market.
[15] “123 Agreements Fact Sheet,” United States Department of State, December 6, 2022, https://www.state.gov/fact-sheets-bureau-of-international-security-and-nonproliferation/123-agreements/.
[16] John Dori and Richard Fisher, “The Strategic Implications of China’s Nuclear Aid to Pakistan,” The Heritage Foundation, June 6, 1998, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/the-strategic-implications-chinas-nuclear-aid-pakistan.
[17] “General Conference,” International Atomic Energy Agency, June 8, 2016, https://www.iaea.org/about/governance/general-conference.
[18] T. V. Paul, “Chinese-Pakistani Nuclear/Missile Ties and the Balance of Power,” The Nonproliferation Review, 2003.
[19] Kelsey Davenport, “Saudi Push for Enrichment Raises Concerns | Arms Control Association,” Arms Control Association, November 2023, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-11/news/saudi-push-enrichment-raises-concerns.
[20] Kim, “Nuclear Belt and Road and U.S.-South Korea Nuclear Cooperation.”
[21] Stephen Kalin and Parisa Hafez, “Saudi Crown Prince Says Will Develop Nuclear Bomb If Iran Does: CBS TV,” Reuters, March 15, 2018, sec. World, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN1GR23Z/.
[22] Dion Nissenbaum and Dov Lieber, “Saudi Uranium Enrichment Floated Under Possible Israel Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2023, sec. World, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-considers-saudi-arabias-nuclear-program-under-potential-normalization-deal-617ae9bd.
[23] “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia,” World Nuclear Association, October 2023, https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-o-s/saudi-arabia.aspx.
[24] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “Tehran’s Shadow Army: Addressing Iran’s Proxy Network in the Middle East,” 108th Cong., 1st sess., February 28, 2024, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/tehrans-shadow-army-addressing-irans-proxy-network-in-the-middle-east.
[25] Summer Said, Sha Hua, and Dion Nissenbaum, “Saudi Arabia Eyes Chinese Bid for Nuclear Plant,” The Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-eyes-chinese-bid-for-nuclear-plant-e4a56f.
[26] José Goldemberg, “Nuclear Energy in Developing Countries,” American Academy of Arts & Sciences, October 1, 2009, https://www.amacad.org/publication/nuclear-energy-developing-countries.
[27] Guido Keller, “Geopolitics of Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Energy Future,” SpecialEurasia, August 28, 2023, https://www.specialeurasia.com/2023/08/28/saudi-arabia-nuclear-energy/.
[28] Shanta Roy, “Saudi Arabia’s Long-Term Goal of Going Nuclear – With U.S. Backing,” International Press Syndicate, November 30, 2018, https://archive-2017-2022.indepthnews.info/index.php/the-world/middle-east/2329-saudi-arabia-s-long-term-goal-of-going-nuclear-with-u-s-backing.
[29] Emma Graham-Harrison, Stephanie Kirchgaessner, and Julian Borger, “Revealed: Saudi Arabia May Have Enough Uranium Ore to Produce Nuclear Fuel,” The Guardian, September 17, 2020, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/17/revealed-saudi-arabia-may-have-enough-uranium-ore-to-produce-nuclear-fuel.
[30] Nissenbaum and Lieber, “Saudi Uranium Enrichment Floated Under Possible Israel Deal.”
[31] World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia.”
[32] World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia.”
Image: “Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant, Rooppur Pabna” by Sanvi Ahmed Saim, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Ruppur_Nuclear_Power_Plant_,_Ruppur,_Pabna.jpg. This file is made available under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication.
