On October 7, 2023, Hamas massacred approximately 1,200 people, abducted hundreds of civilians, and launched thousands of rockets in the deadliest terrorist attack ever committed on Israeli soil. Following the attack, Hezbollah and Israel began exchanging strikes in the north of Israel; the Houthis in Yemen launched cruise missiles toward Israel, U.S. naval assets, and merchant vessels in the Red Sea; and between October 17 and November 18, 2023, militant groups such as the Badr Brigades and Kata’ib Hezbollah attacked U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria 61 times, inducing U.S. military retaliation. This carnage is intimately connected with Iran’s financing and empowerment of jihadist groups across the Middle East. Meanwhile, Iran’s persistent uranium enrichment and pursuit of nuclear weapons threaten to spark regional arms races and further embolden Iran’s jihadist proxies. All signs point towards a failure of deterrence, which the United States must now restore through a long-term “maximum pressure” strategy leveraging all instruments of diplomatic, economic, and military statecraft.
A Failure of Deterrence
U.S. foreign policy towards Iran for the past decade has been erratic, swinging between escalation and restraint. The Obama administration’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which sought to limit Iran’s uranium enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief, was quickly thrown out by the Trump administration, which withdrew from the JCPOA, imposed a panoply of new sanctions, and utilized military force in new ways — most famously by eliminating Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Iranian Quds Force. Currently, the Biden administration maintains a two-pronged approach toward Tehran: it offers up some form of sanctions relief for de-escalation while conducting limited kinetic operations against Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These pendulum swings and a lack of vision have drained resources, emboldened adversaries, and stifled nonproliferation efforts.
Some argue that a strategy like that of the Biden administration is wise. Though the JCPOA is dead, an informal agreement and political ceasefire would provide the time necessary to negotiate a more lasting agreement, so the argument goes. Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and a well-known defender of this view, argues that “without this informal agreement, the two sides would steadily be moving toward a disastrous confrontation.” [1] “Informal agreement” here refers to negotiations between the United States and Iran that bid Iran to halt lethal attacks against U.S. forces perpetrated by its proxies, refrain from enriching uranium beyond 60 percent, and stop selling ballistic missiles to Russia. In exchange, the United States is expected to unfreeze billions of dollars in Iranian assets and refrain from tightening sanctions. [2] Negotiating with Iran assumes, however, that Iran will abide by the terms of agreements. Though the United States did persuade Iran to release five American hostages after unfreezing $6 billion USD worth of Iranian assets, Iran-backed proxies shortly thereafter escalated lethal attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq, demonstrating their unwillingness to abide by terms – whether formal or informal – in good faith. Moreover, the strategy of unfreezing assets to release hostages signals to Iran that taking hostages can effectively erode the U.S. sanctions regime and unlock new resources for financing jihadist proxies, investing in its nuclear program, and supplying weapons to Russia with greater impunity. [3] Such a strategy ultimately incentivizes Iran and other adversarial regimes to take more hostages to erode the effectiveness of sanctions, directly contributing to further violence.
Another common sentiment is that the Middle East’s role in both the world and in great power competition is diminishing, while China’s ability to influence international norms and security is strengthening. For instance, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities Mara Karlin and Director of Foreign Assistance for the U.S. Department of State Tamara Wittes outline three reasons why the Middle East has become less internationally relevant: the chances of interstate war are historically low, Asia and the Indo-Pacific’s relevance have simply increased, and Middle Eastern oil is becoming less relevant due to technological advancement and concerns about greenhouse gasses. [4]
As evidenced by the October 7 attacks, the number of Middle Eastern conflicts does not seem to be at a historic low. Though Drs. Karlin and Wittes correctly identify China’s rise as an increasing threat, it does not follow that the United States should therefore be less engaged in the Middle East. Such an approach ignores, for example, Asia’s dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil. [5] China also has significant infrastructure investments, diplomatic inroads, and an increasing military presence in the region. [6] Jon Alterman, director of the Middle East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, correctly emphasizes that “Asian allies of the United States worry China similarly will seek to become dominant in the Middle East before anyone understands what has happened and then use its dominance of Middle Eastern energy in order to advance its control over them.” [7] For U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific, the price and accessibility of oil, the maintenance of regional stability, and the denial of Beijing’s influence in Middle Eastern energy markets all remain crucial for both their strategic posture and U.S. Indo-Pacific strategic competition with China.
Tehran successfully becoming a nuclear-armed state and employing its regional network of jihadist proxies at major flashpoints in the Gulf and the Levant would strike devastating blows to regional stability. [8-9] A nuclear-armed Iran would likely both induce Saudi Arabia to pursue the creation of its own nuclear arsenal and further empower Iran to follow through on its threats to reshape the Middle East in its image. [10] Such a scenario increases the risks of a dangerous miscalculation. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Eric Edelman, former President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Andrew Krepinevich, and Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Evan Montgomery correctly assess that since “emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine based nuclear forces,” this “likely vulnerability” combined with “the close proximity of states in the Middle East and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region” could compel “any new nuclear powers…to ‘launch on warning’ of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively.” [11] A nuclear-armed Iran could thus behave more aggressively and increase the sophistication and range of weaponry that it delivers to its proxies. [12]
To prevent these strategic catastrophes, the United States must maintain a long-term regional security architecture in the Middle East based on both deterrence-by-denial and deterrence-by-punishment. Deterrence-by-denial deters by making an action unlikely to succeed while deterrence-by-punishment deters by threatening to impose penalties after an action has occurred. [13]
Deterrence-by-Denial
In U.S. defense policy, deterrence-by-denial entails maintaining the military capabilities to crush any offensive moves made by an adversary. Such a policy might look like, for example, preemptively increasing Taiwan’s lethal capabilities to make Chinese aggression more difficult or constructing missile defense systems to make a nuclear strike less likely to succeed. The United States should apply a similar principle towards Iran that decreases the effectiveness of Iran’s jihadist proxies or its potential future nuclear weapons. To further a deterrence-by-denial strategy, developing an Integrated Air and Missile Defense system (IAMD) in the Middle East is crucial. Because IAMDs can intercept and decrease the effectiveness of Iranian conventional missiles, Iran might elect to supply its jihadist proxies with fewer missile systems. Director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute, Bilal Saab, correctly identifies that an “IAMD may not always prevent Iranian attacks, but it will no doubt influence Tehran’s calculations.” [14] A similar logic can be applied to Iranian nuclear ambitions; though IAMD systems might not entirely prevent Iran from pursuing nuclear missiles, the decreased effectiveness in launching missiles may increase Tehran’s willingness to give concessions in a bargaining scenario. A long-term deterrence-by-denial strategy must also focus on developing greater counterterrorism and warfighting capabilities in partner states, which would deal another blow to Iran’s military effectiveness. This could involve conducting joint military exercises, facilitating Israeli normalization with other Gulf states, improving Saudi Arabia’s military capabilities, and – akin to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) integrated command structure – aiming to streamline and integrate command and control among the Gulf states and Israel.
Deterrence-by-Punishment
Simultaneously, the United States must pursue a deterrence-by-punishment strategy that deters Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon and from funneling material support to its jihadist proxies. Deterrence-by-punishment requires first establishing the credibility and capability of the coercer. For the United States, this means the first step is preparing, rallying, and coordinating a coalition of willing states in the Middle East and abroad to punish Iran. As the managing director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Michael Singh argues, preemptive coordination is essential if the United States ever plans on employing military force in response to an Iranian nuclear outbreak. [15] Such coordination increases the United States’s capabilities to respond militarily to Tehran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and increases the credibility of a U.S. military response.
Next, as evidenced by the current pattern of attacks by Iran-backed militias, the current tit-for-tat strategy of retaliating against militias in Syria or Iraq after they launch attacks against U.S. forces is not a sufficient deterrent. Because Iran believes that attacks on American forces through asymmetric means will not provoke direct or costly military responses, the mullahs continue to fund jihadist proxies that attack U.S. forces. [16] In 1988, the Reagan administration initiated Operation Praying Mantis, sinking Iranian naval vessels in response to Iran’s mining of a U.S. warship. This deterred the continued mining of international waters and pressured Iran into a ceasefire with Iraq, concluding the Iran-Iraq War. Similarly, the United States should signal through limited air strikes that directly striking Iranian military assets – including weaponry, naval vessels, and officers – is not off limits, thereby enhancing the credibility of a U.S. deterrence-by-punishment strategy. Demonstrating resolve in this manner would aim to simultaneously compel Iran to decrease support for its proxies today and deter Iran’s financing of proxies in the future. As a byproduct, the degradation of Iranian military capabilities from a limited strike would also decrease Iran’s available military resources it can funnel towards jihadist proxies.
A similar principle applies to Iran’s current nuclear enrichment. As Iran surpasses the now-defunct JCPOA’s uranium enrichment limits, the United States should explicitly and publicly threaten Iran with force should Iran pursue uranium enrichment past a certain level and maintain their escalatory attacks against U.S. forces and partners. Publicly declaring such a threat and demonstrating capabilities and credibility through exercises, continued freedom of navigation missions, and an increased air presence would enhance the credibility of a general U.S. deterrence posture while providing a chance for Iran to halt uranium enrichment. Moreover, a strike directly on Iranian military assets can assure Middle Eastern partners of the United States’s willingness to counter and combat Iranian-backed terrorism and nuclear proliferation efforts. Such assurance is especially needed when Saudi Arabia has offered Iran investments in sanction-stricken sectors of its economy in exchange for Iran restraining its regional jihadist proxies. [17] This lack of U.S. assurance thus far has demonstrated to Iran that proxies can be leveraged as effective bargaining chips while weakening the existing sanctions regime. This also signals to other international actors an increased U.S. tolerance towards states sponsoring terrorism to achieve national objectives.
Some argue that military action against Iran is ineffective. Julien Barnes-Dacey and Ellie Geranmayeh at the European Council on Foreign Relations, for example, posit that Iran has shifted nuclear facilities underground to avoid sabotage, thereby making strikes less effective. [18] Though the impact of an attack is hard to predict, others estimate, however, that airstrikes against Iran by Israel alone could delay Iran’s ability to acquire a nuclear weapon by two years, while bunker buster strikes by the United States could delay Iran’s ability to acquire a nuclear weapon by approximately four years. [19] Pinpointing exactly how Iran’s nuclear policy will evolve is difficult. It is entirely possible that Iran will continue pursuing nuclear weapons; it is also possible that it will delay pursuing nuclear weapons for a few years or even indefinitely. Regardless, Matthew Kroenig, a professor of political science at Georgetown University, aptly points out that “if Iran did try to reconstitute its nuclear program, it would be forced to contend with continued international pressure, greater difficulty in securing necessary nuclear materials on the international market, and the lurking possibility of subsequent attacks.” [20] A report from the Iran Project nonetheless supports the idea of slowing down Iran’s nuclear program, arguing that “if Iran were to decide to replace a severely damaged or destroyed Fordow facility, it would have to build again deeper underground and perhaps place smaller facilities in more remote areas, all of which would be time consuming.” [21] Even if deterrence fails, Iran’s ability to import critical materials and rebuild its nuclear capabilities would be drastically impaired.
Others argue that a direct strike against Iranian strategic assets will spark a broader regional war in which thousands of missiles fired by Iranian proxies will rain down upon Israel and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states that have normalized or are in the process of normalizing relations with Israel. [22] Iran’s historical track record in responding to U.S. strikes and declarations, however, suggests otherwise. Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Fellow Reuel Marc Gerecht and Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow Ray Takeyh correctly argue that Trump’s assassination of Soleimani prompted an Iranian response that went no further than short missile barrages at U.S. forces in Iraq. They further note that “in 2003, when Mr. Khamenei feared the possibility of the Bush administration unleashing its ‘shock and awe’ warfare on Iran, the clerical regime suspended its uranium enrichment.” [23] The United States maintains escalation dominance at every rung of the ladder against Iran, and every time the United States has escalated, Iran has failed to follow through with its threats in response. Even so, escalation does risk drawing the United States into a broader conflict with Iran. An air campaign designed to cripple Iranian nuclear capabilities is, however, still preferable to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Striking key nuclear facilities could set Iran’s nuclear capabilities back by years with the added benefit of changing Iran’s calculations and hampering its ability to pursue a nuclear weapon. [24-25]
As evidenced by Hamas’s October 7 assault and Iran’s April 13 missile attack on Israel, Iran still poses a threat to nuclear nonproliferation goals and regional stability. With the Middle East’s increasing volatility, deterring Iran in its pursuit of nuclear weapons and in its financing of jihadist proxies will not be an easy feat. General deterrence against a persistent, revisionist power requires a long-term vision coordinating U.S. partners and all tools of economic, diplomatic, and military statecraft. Nevertheless, kicking the can down the road will only increase the price the United States has to pay in the future to preserve regional stability, the norms surrounding weapons of mass destruction nonproliferation, and restrictions against the use of terrorism to achieve strategic objectives.
Alexander Richter ’27 is a member of the AHS chapter at the University of California, Berkeley, where he is majoring in Political Science and Economics.
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Notes:
[1] Trita Parsi, “An Unwritten Deal Is Exactly What Iran and America Need,” Foreign Policy, June 20, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/06/20/an-unwritten-deal-is-exactly-what-iran-and-america-need/.
[2] Michael Crowley, Farnaz Fassihi, and Ronen Bergman, “Hoping to Avert Nuclear Crisis, U.S. Seeks Informal Agreement With Iran,” New York Times, June 14, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/14/us/politics/biden-iran-nuclear-program.html.
[3] Bret Stephens, “How Much Is an American Hostage Worth?” New York Times, August 15, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/15/opinion/iran-hostage-swap.html.
[4] Mara Karlin and Tamara Wittes, “America’s Middle East Purgatory,” Foreign Affairs, December 11, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2018-12-11/americas-middle-east-purgatory .
[5] “Factbox: Asia region is most dependent on Middle East crude oil, LNG supplies,” Reuters, January 8, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/asia-mideast-oil-factbox/factbox-asia-region-is-most-dependent-on-middle-east-crude-oil-lng-supplies-idINKBN1Z71VW .
[6] Mohammad Eslami and Maria Papageorgiou, “China’s Increasing Role in the Middle East: Implications for Regional and International Dynamics,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, June 2, 2023, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2023/06/02/chinas-increasing-role-in-the-middle-east-implications-for-regional-and-international-dynamics/.[7] Jon B. Alterman, “Pivoting to Asia Doesn’t Get You Out of the Middle East,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, October 19, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/pivoting-asia-doesnt-get-you-out-middle-east.
[8] Ariel Levite, “Deciphering Iran’s Nuclear Strategy,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 10, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/10/deciphering-iran-s-nuclear-strategy-pub-85313.
[9] Ashley Lane, “Iran’s Islamist Proxies in the Middle East,” Wilson Center, September 12, 2023, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies.
[10] Julian Borger, “Crown prince confirms Saudi Arabia will seek nuclear arsenal if Iran develops one,” The Guardian, September 21, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/21/crown-prince-confirms-saudi-arabia-seek-nuclear-arsenal-iran-develops-one.
[11]Eric S. Edelman, Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr., and Evan B. Montgomery, “The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January 1, 2011, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/persian-gulf/2011-01-01/dangers-nuclear-iran.
[12] Colin H. Kahl and Kenneth N. Waltz, “Iran and the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs, July 17, 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran-and-bomb.
[13] Michael J. Mazarr, Understanding Deterrence, PE-295-RC (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), 2.
[14] Bilal Y. Saab, “Integrated Air and Missile Defense Will Enhance Security in the Middle East,” The National Interest, October 30, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/integrated-air-and-missile-defense-will-enhance-security-middle-east-195677.
[15] Michael Singh, “Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 28, 2023, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-nuclear-endgame-warrants-change-us-strategy.
[16] Luis E. Sanchez Jr., “Praying Mantis II: The Answer to Iranian Compliance,” Defense Technical Information Center, June 2010, 63, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA530045.pdf.
[17] Sam Dagher, “Saudi Arabia Offers Iran Investment to Blunt Gaza War,” Bloomberg, November 29, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-11-29/iran-saudi-proposals-seek-to-deescalate-tensions-amid-israel-hamas-war.
[18] Julien Barnes-Dacey and Ellie Geranmayeh, “The West Must Do More to Prevent Conflict With Iran,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/03/biden-eu-iran-nuclear-prevent-war/.
[19] “Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran,” Iran Project, September 20, 2012, 9, https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/media/IranReport_091112_FULL%20FINAL.pdf.
[20] Matthew Kroenig, “Time to Attack Iran: Why a Strike Is the Least Bad Option,” Foreign Affairs, January 1, 2012, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2012-01-01/time-attack-iran.
[21] “Weighing Benefits and Costs of Military Action Against Iran,” Iran Project, September 20, 2012, 17, https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/legacy/media/IranReport_091112_FULL%20FINAL.pdf.
[22] Bruce Riedel and Annelle R. Sheline, “Why bombing Iran is (still) a bad idea,” Brookings Institution, December 14, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why-bombing-iran-is-still-a-bad-idea/.
[23] Reuel Marc Gerecht and Ray Takeyh, “Prepare for an Iranian Escalation,” Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/prepare-for-an-iranian-escalation-gaza-israel-23cdc9af?mod=opinion_lead_pos6.
[24] William J. Broad, John Markoff, and David E. Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay,” New York Times, January 15, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html.
[25] Matthew Kroenig, “Still Time to Attack Iran,” Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2014-01-07/still-time-attack-iran.
Image: “This photo is from the launch of a Sejil missile at an undisclosed location in Iran on November 12, 2008” by Vahid Reza Alaei, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sejjil_missile_launch_-_November_2008_(11).jpg. This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license.
