In foreign policy discussions around America’s grand strategy, considerable emphasis has been placed on the need to balance various instruments of national power – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – to deter adversaries such as Russia and China effectively. Books and articles are oversaturated with discussions around grand strategy as scholars debate how the United States should define and pursue its foreign policy aims. However, they rarely investigate whether the United States has the capabilities and resources required to execute those goals. If the United States aims to pursue foreign policy objectives grounded in realistic assessments of its capabilities, it must examine each instrument of national power individually under a microscope.
Among these sources of national power, the military has often been the least understood. Universities usually offer plenty of courses on international relations theory, diplomatic history, and grand strategy but only a few on security and military history. As a result, civilian leaders responsible for policymaking often lack a comprehensive understanding of the different military services unless they have prior military experience. Even for those with such experience, grasping all the intricacies of the different services and their operational methods remains challenging. In The Masks of War, senior RAND analyst Carl Builder argues that America’s military forces are primarily shaped by their distinct institutional interests rather than domestic political leadership or the geopolitical environment. He views each military service as having “distinct and enduring personalities,” a significant insight for civilian leaders seeking to anticipate how the military will behave. [1]
Builder only analyzed the United States Army, Navy, and Air Force in his work, omitting the two other branches of the American military that existed at his time of writing: the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard. Nevertheless, his analytical framework remains valuable today. Builder compares the services through the lens of the five “faces” – service personalities – which offer insights into their attitudes and behaviors. [2] The “faces” through which he compares the services are: their most important principle or ideal, how services measure themselves organizationally, their interests in new weapon systems or their tradecraft, interservice distinctions, and how they preserve their service independence and legitimacy.
His analysis presupposes, however, that institutional interests and personalities are the primary drivers of service behavior. While he briefly acknowledges external geopolitical forces that may influence service behaviors, Builder does not give them enough significance. In fact, he underappreciates the dynamic forces at play, such as world tension or the likely means by which the next possible war might be fought. Moreover, he struggles to persuade his audience why he chose the five “faces.” He explains that they facilitate fresh comparisons and encompass sufficient features of service personalities. [3] Yet alternative aspects – such as service leadership, promotion criteria, or a service’s relationship with Congress – could have been equally valid subjects of analysis. Builder’s analysis lacks insights into potential factors that might alter the different “faces” and how much they have become rigid or flexible over time. Relationships with Congress would be a particularly important factor today because of the increasing politicization of the military.
Using the five “faces,” Builder later sketches profiles of the three services that provide useful first sketches for those with little military knowledge or exposure. There are several noteworthy points from Builder’s analysis of the Navy, including his assessment that the Navy values its “stature as an independent institution” and maintains a conviction that sea power is the most crucial arena for the United States. [4] Builder describes the Air Force members as bonded by their mutual love of flying machines and their fascination with emerging technologies. The Army, according to Builder, is best characterized as the nation’s most “obedient and loyal military servant,” guided by a shared sense of brotherhood. [5] While these brief sketches benefit casual American military observers, they may lack the depth necessary for senior civilian leaders to make strategic decisions. Builder could have provided further analysis to link these sketches with concrete policy recommendations. For instance, he could have explored how investment in specific training programs and revised command structures could enhance the services’ readiness to address future challenges.
While Builder’s work is outdated and lacks analysis that connects observations to recommendations, it underscores the significant influence of service personalities on future military planning. Builder presents a unique argument centered on the idea that different services harbor distinct images of conflict and how to fight wars. For instance, an infantryman’s perception would differ from a sailor’s because they have distinct roles and personalities. Senior civilian leaders aiming to grasp the entirety of the situation must recognize that strategic culture and service tactics are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. As such, employing a bottom-up approach that seeks to understand the warfighting capabilities of different military services will provide an accurate assessment of the means policymakers have at their disposal. Foreign policy objectives should thus ultimately rest upon a realistic conception of what is possible; and the best way to gauge that is to examine the military services as institutions interacting with each other in the current geopolitical environment. Additionally, while Builder scrutinizes how different services have grappled with new technologies, he neglects to explore how nuclear weapons could influence service behavior. Today, such analysis would examine each service’s attitudes and role in ensuring effective deterrence within the U.S. nuclear triad, especially as the U.S. faces two near-peer nuclear competitors in Russia and China.
Although Builder’s analysis may not encompass every aspect of modern warfare, it lays a strong foundation for deeper investigations into and greater refinements of strategic thinking in military planning. Builder’s work reminds readers of the enduring significance of understanding military power. By acknowledging each branch’s distinct perspectives and personalities, policymakers can better leverage the entire spectrum of military power to address emerging geopolitical challenges.
Kevin Zhang ’24 served as an officer at the AHS chapter at Georgetown University, where he earned a B.A. in International Politics and is currently pursuing an M.A. in Security Studies.
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Notes:
[1] Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).
[2] Builder, Masks of War, 17.
[3] Builder, Masks of War, 17.
[4] Builder, Masks of War, 31.
[5] Builder, Masks of War, 33.
Image: “Fat Albert, a U.S. Marine Corps C-130T Hercules with the Blue Angels, the Navy’s flight demonstration squadron, flies over Marines with the Silent Drill Platoon at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma, Ariz., March 4, 2014” by Staff Sgt. Oscar L. Olive IV, U.S. Marine Corps, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Fat_Albert_low_level_pass.jpg. This file is a work of a United States Marine or employee, taken or made as part of that person’s official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, it is in the public domain.
