Russia’s Other War: The Forgotten Sorrows of Syria

Once at the forefront of global attention, the Syrian civil war now rarely registers comment. What more is there to observe, beyond dashed dreams, widespread desolation, and the ruthless will of despots? Yet Syria today is an expanding crisis, pitting the United States and its partners against Russia, Iran, and the Assad regime, with consequences for the future of humanitarian relief, regional stability, and Russia’s power to threaten its neighbors.

The Assad regime has regained territory in Syria since 2015, aided by Russian air power and Iranian-backed militias. This has come at staggering human costs: half of Syria’s population is displaced, 90 percent live in poverty, and 60 percent fear starvation. For Washington, this suffering is not only a human travesty but a political risk. Turkey, a NATO ally riven with economic woes, has struggled to absorb millions of refugees. Likewise, far-right parties in Europe opposed to NATO and aligned with Russia have made refugees into a political wedge issue. Besides provoking refugee crises, Russia benefits from the instability it has caused in Syria in other ways. Humanitarian and energy corridors to and through Syria can only be kept open via Russian agreement, enhancing Russia’s diplomatic leverage. Supporting Assad makes Russia a military power in the Mediterranean, a goal it has pursued to Western consternation for centuries. While its diplomatic and economic influence is limited, Washington can wield sanctions against Assad regime elites, assist European courts in documenting Russian and Assad regime human rights abuses, and provide military and humanitarian aid to anti-Assad groups like the Syrian Democratic Forces. With the defense of Ukraine in the balance, opportunities to diminish advantages Russia draws from countries like Syria will grow in importance.

Questions and Background

  • Why has the mixture of coercion and diplomacy pursued by both the Obama and Trump administrations towards Assad generally failed to produce desired results?
  • In what ways have American goals in Syria like counterterrorism, humanitarian relief, and supporting opposition groups been in conflict with one another?
  • What policy instruments does Washington have to contest Russian influence in Syria? Would doing so relieve pressure on Ukraine?
  • Is Russia’s endgame in Syria a “frozen conflict” like it has produced elsewhere? If so, does this offer insight into its goals in Ukraine?

The US Can’t Just Quit the Middle East
Danielle Pletka. The Dispatch. March 30, 2022.  

Russia’s Battle for the Black Sea
Angela Stent. Foreign Affairs. August 16, 2021.

The Search for a Syria Strategy
Andrew Tabler. Foreign Affairs. July 27, 2021. 

Why is Russia in Syria?
Jakub Grygiel. The American Interest. January 3, 2020. 

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