Sun Tzu’s The Art of War is one of the most renowned achievements in the Chinese strategic tradition. At first glance, the tactics described in the book are not useful to a modern strategist; the book was a field manual in the Warring States period of Chinese antiquity, written for an era of combat when the chariot ruled the battlefield. But The Art of War is famous for its timeless strategic principles, especially its counsel to generally avoid direct confrontation and instead pursue large-scale strategic victories that preserve capital and military assets. Sun Tzu advises commanders that “those who win every battle are not really skillful – those who render armies helpless without fighting are the best of all. The superior militarist strikes schemes. The next best is to attack alliances. The next best is to attack the army. The lowest is to attack a city.” [1]
Certain policymakers and strategists believe that the text is potentially useful for understanding contemporary Chinese military strategy, especially with respect to Taiwan, which Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping wants “to be ready by 2027” to seize by force. [2] Sun Tzu’s traditional military strategy centers on deception, diplomacy, and preservation, and if China’s long-term goal is to achieve Pacific hegemony, it would be best to do so without directly engaging its forces. Rather than lay siege to Taipei, Beijing could focus on deteriorating U.S. alliances and the U.S.-led world order.
By eroding U.S. partnerships in the Pacific, China could continue to take over global institutions, erase national identities in Asia, and subvert governments, economies, and cultures to bring Pacific countries under its own sway. Sun Tzu would advise – and the Chinese Communist Party seems partially interested in pursuing – a strategy that would avoid a brutal war with the United States over Taiwan in favor of both wearing down the desire of the Taiwanese people to be independent and mitigating their means to maintain sovereignty.
Sustainable Chinese regional hegemony in Asia is impossible without the hard military capability to back it, but China’s recent military build-up does not necessarily imply a littoral invasion of Taiwan. This distinction, which could be pulled directly from Sun Tzu’s counsel to “win without fighting,” is something that deserves more attention from U.S. military strategists, as modern warfare can occur outside of the traditional mandate of the Department of Defense.
There are, however, real questions about the application of this text to the realities of Chinese warfare. Dr. Toshi Yoshihara, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, argues in his chapter “Sun Zi and the Search for a Timeless Logic of Strategy” in The New Makers of Modern Strategy that despite being one of China’s foundational military texts, The Art of War is not that useful as a tool to analyze Beijing’s long-term planning. [3] He notes that a Chinese history of warfare and use of violent force shows that Sun Tzu’s non-violent strategies have not been deeply intertwined with Chinese military tradition for over two millennia. The largest pitfall of The Art of War is its elasticity, as strategists with different interpretations use its maxims to produce conflicting results. This makes it difficult for strategists to use The Art of War to predict or model Chinese grand strategy.
That is not to say that reading The Art of War is a fool’s errand. Dr. Yoshihara also acknowledges that the book “illustrates the logic of strategy that transcends national and cultural boundaries,” and if readers are not dogmatic about its teachings, it can be insightful. [4]Sun Tzu’s strategic maxims can still provide valuable insights for modern U.S. policymakers.
The United States should do everything it can to support Taiwan and other Indo-Pacific allies if it wants to prevail against China and make clear its commitment to the democratic world order it built. This is best achieved by providing unyielding military support to U.S. allies in East Asia, and especially preemptive aid to Taiwan, to allay fears about Pacific security in an increasingly imperiled world, with active or impending proxy conflicts in multiple theaters. But the United States must also understand that the raw strength of its armed forces is not the only measure of power, and it may not be the main determinant of victory or defeat against its adversaries. China will likely seek to change the balance in East Asia through more than just military means.
The Art of War does not have to be authoritative or explanatory of modern Chinese doctrine to have useful wisdom for U.S. strategists. A Sun Tzu-inspired strategy would expand the concept of security beyond kinetic action. It would seek to emphasize the strength of the U.S.-led world order and alliance structure to deter China – and in so doing, win without fighting.
George Sarbinowski ’24 served as the President of the AHS chapter at Cornell University, where he earned a B.A. in Government and Near Eastern Studies.
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Notes:
[1] Sun Tzu, The Complete Art of War, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, (New York: Basic Books, 2008).
[2] Toshi Yoshihara, “Sun Zi and the Search for a Timeless Logic of Strategy,” in The New Makers of Modern Strategy: From the Ancient World to the Digital Age, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2023).
[3] Hope Yen, “CIA Chief: China Has Some Doubt on Ability to Invade Taiwan,” AP News, February 26, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-taiwan-politics-
[4] Yoshihara, “Sun Zi and the Search for a Timeless Logic of Strategy.”
