Although the illicit drug trade has existed for centuries, its expansion over the past few years is a concerning threat to U.S. national security. In 2022, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention reported an all-time high of almost 110,000 drug-related deaths in the United States. Though this number decreased in 2023, the narcotics supply chain that fuels and exacerbates the opioid epidemic continues to grow. [1] Currently, the U.S. strategy to reduce the supply of illicit substances is two-pronged: combat and treat a growing narcotics crisis domestically and disrupt supply chains across the globe before drugs reach the borders of the United States. [2] The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is one of the largest producers of fentanyl and fentanyl-related substances that reach the United States. [3] Over multiple administrations, the United States attempted to cooperate with China on reducing illicit substance flows with limited successes. Setbacks such as China’s abrupt suspension of bilateral counternarcotics cooperation over former Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan show that China’s partnership on this important issue is unreliable, and that Beijing is willing to use it as a bargaining chip in other political disputes. [4] The United States must find other reliable means of weakening the global narcotics trade and take the initiative to lead an effective global counternarcotics coalition. Only after a solidified and credible alliance is forged can the United States pressure China to comply with counternarcotics efforts.
A Transnational Approach for a Transnational Crime
The flow of illegal narcotics is transnational, making this criminal enterprise not just a domestic national security concern but a truly global security threat. Though the bulk of fentanyl-related substances originates from China, drug producers in other countries are involved with the manufacturing, refinement, and transport of these and other narcotics. Regularly faced with international sanctions and counternarcotics policies, the global narcotics trade has diversified its supply chain to make it increasingly difficult for law enforcement to intercept and seize its illegal products or otherwise disrupt its production. [5] New source and transit countries such as India and Mexico now serve as intermediaries that refine or dilute Chinese narcotics, which eventually make their way into the United States. [6]
Narcotics production, now that it has become truly transnational, has adopted basic risk management measures by offshoring its production centers. Narcotics production operations are known to have switched production from China to India to avoid scrutiny from domestic law enforcement, for example, making it difficult for Chinese counternarcotics officials to stop narcotics operations once they cross the border into India. [7] In general, it is unlikely for Chinese authorities to reach out to their Indian counterparts to jointly address the transnational aspects of the global narcotics trade. Chinese counternarcotics officials are increasingly powerless to stop the offshoring of Chinese narcotics operations to India and other production sites. Chinese bilateral cooperation with other key nations has also rarely been effective. For example, due to the Chinese government’s denials that Chinese-origin fentanyl ever reaches Mexico, China’s cooperation with Mexico has been historically subdued. Similarly, the Chinese government has denied any involvement in contributing to the United States’s opioid epidemic. [8] There has been to date no major effort to enact any policies that would involve joint law enforcement cooperation, information sharing, or tighter transport policy. Although there have been budding efforts to jointly address the global narcotics trade and the U.S. opioid epidemic, China has repeatedly pulled out, stalled, or otherwise jeopardized potential cooperation with the United States. [9-10]
Because courting China’s cooperation will be difficult and unreliable, one approach to combating the global narcotics trade is expanding the scope of U.S. counternarcotics diplomacy and working with other major players surrounding China’s narcotics operations, such as Mexico and India. Even if the United States and China both committed to a working relationship, it still would be wise to deepen engagement with other nations in joint counternarcotics activities.
Multilateralizing the Counternarcotics Effort
In the absence of a key partner for countries combating the global narcotics trade, the United States is presented with a crucial opportunity to fill this vacancy. In establishing new relationships and strengthening already existing partnerships, the United States would not only address the short-term issue of reducing the scale of the global narcotics trade, but also strengthen the United States’s global image as a trusted partner with aligned interests and values. Furthermore, expanding the scope and scale of outreach to different countries would indirectly yet significantly help stem the flow of Chinese-origin narcotics, especially at a time when Chinese counternarcotics cooperation is often shaky and unreliable. On an operational level, the United States could establish official working groups with key partners such as India and work to increase both nations’ interdiction capabilities, joint law enforcement training, and information sharing between the respective countries’ law enforcement agencies.
Although the United States already has an established, working relationship with certain countries, such as Colombia and Mexico, the United States would further benefit from integrating these bilateral ties into a larger multilateral framework. [11] If the narcotics flow crosses multiple international borders, counternarcotics dialogue and cooperation should also reach across multiple nations. Thus, building upon key bilateral relationships, the United States should establish a framework that addresses the transnational nature of the narcotics problem: the International Counternarcotics Agency (ICA).
The ICA would offer an array of benefits that would help not only the United States but other countries with narcotics issues combat the global drug trade. One such benefit would be the easier coordination countries can establish when crafting strategic and operational plans for disrupting the flow of narcotics throughout the world. The ICA would also ideally provide nations with the means necessary to disrupt the drug trade. Funding for counternarcotics operations could be directed to geographic hotspots where action is needed most, such as in the Sonora region of Mexico, home to many clandestine fentanyl labs, or certain sea lanes in the Pacific, through which narcotics are shipped. Another major benefit of the ICA’s design would be that it would not allow for one nation to dominate the dialogue, coordination, and directives in the global counternarcotics efforts, thereby making it more attractive for different partner nations to join and participate. Lastly, the ICA’s platform allows nations to engage in close and frequent communications with one another, streamlining logistics in the global offensive against narcotics.
The multinational character of the ICA also incentivizes states to more seriously engage in counternarcotics efforts. The funding, personnel, and diplomatic backing provided by the ICA would encourage skeptical governments to invest in the mission at hand. Granting these nations a stake in global counternarcotics operations also opens up possibilities for future cooperation in other areas of transnational crime like human trafficking.
Employing institutions to combat the global narcotics trade is not a novel idea. The United States’s most recent 2022 National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) calls for “[strengthening] international partnerships and [fostering] bilateral exchanges to collaboratively address drug-related problems as a shared responsibility.” [12] Though the NDCS is one of the most authoritative and helpful documents guiding the United States’s counternarcotics strategy, it does not fully address the international nature of the problem. While the NDCS briefly mentions increasing engagement in forums such as the U.S.-EU Political Dialogue on Drugs, many actionable proposals are limited in scope and breadth. For example, although the NDCS’s recommendation for greater participation in the North American Drug Dialogue with Canada and Mexico might help the United States limit drug transport into the United States, it fails to expand the scope to include other nations where narcotics are produced and distributed. Tools such as dialogues, information sharing, and guidelines also only serve to engage nations that are already incentivized to expend resources for counternarcotics operations.
The ICA complements the NDCS by providing a more specific operational framework for the United States and partner nations and by adding an international perspective to the domestic-oriented NDCS. This operational framework would potentially be helpful in coordinating the actions and strategies of various government agencies in the United States that engage in counternarcotics operations but do not have a unified procedure in doing so. The ICA would also serve as a permanent vehicle for the United States and its partners to coordinate strategy in the dynamic landscape of counternarcotics operations, contrasting the infrequent update schedule of the NDCS.
One of the most difficult and vital aspects of these international partnerships is obtaining the cooperation and trust of the United States’s most important counternarcotics allies. The United States must approach this objective by utilizing a variety of different approaches at once. One method would be implementing intelligence diplomacy in the United States’s international counternarcotics strategy. The National Drug Control Strategy already alludes to using this approach, calling for engagement in reducing the drug supply by cooperating with existing organizations and frameworks like the Five Eyes agreement. [13] Although sharing intelligence between the Five Eyes countries is paramount to combating the global narcotics trade – especially considering Five Eyes nations have some of the most severe opioid crises in the world – the United States would gain even more from engaging in intelligence diplomacy with other counternarcotics partners beyond the Five Eyes. [14] The United States could share crucial information – such as suspected drug routes, narcotics production activity, or information on individuals related to the drug trade like the identities and locations of kingpins or drug mules – with foreign law enforcement entities that could interdict narcotics-related activities occurring in a certain region or country. This framework could be the basis of cooperative counternarcotics operations in critical regions like the Golden Triangle. Here, ICA states could work together to intercept Chinese-origin narcotics headed towards labs in the region for refinement or disrupt cartel activities south of the U.S. border with Mexico, with the ultimate aim of stopping the flow of narcotics before it ever reaches the United States. [15]
Such intelligence sharing could also incentivize other nations to reciprocate and cooperate in counternarcotics actions. This is, however, a double-edged sword. Paired with the tool of public diplomacy, the United States and its allies could release intelligence to global actors on the United States’s adversaries, some of which are the main actors engaged in illegal narcotics production and distribution. Likewise, public shaming of adversaries engaged in the narcotics trade could put political pressure on U.S. adversaries to crack down on domestic narcotics production.
Much of illegal narcotics production and trade is concentrated in the black market private sector. Though government entities may wish to cooperate with the international community in stemming the flow of narcotics, the actual producers themselves, ranging from individual farmers to large corporations, would not wish to comply with the counternarcotics imperative. [16-17] To address this issue, the United States could expand track 1.5 and 2 dialogues with key business and local leaders to improve global counternarcotics efforts at every level. The United States could also provide financial and economic assistance to farmers in partner countries, giving them an opportunity to pursue licit development in lieu of continuing to produce and manufacture illicit narcotics –– provided that the United States or the ICA validates that the farmers are no longer producing illicit crops. [18] Offering these economic alternatives also makes it easier for the United States to obtain cooperation from key partners when first establishing bilateral relations.
Finally, the United States could also provide security assistance to key counternarcotics allies. The United States could offer protection to merchant ships that are at risk of intimidation and forced smuggling from cartels, making it easier for them to cooperate with counternarcotics law enforcement operations. This form of U.S. assistance could be effective in stopping transnational criminal organizations from transporting narcotics within the Western Hemisphere, especially Mexican drug trafficking groups that have been able to conduct narcotics-related activities due to a lack of strong security presence on Mexico’s coast and in its ports. [19] The United States could offer to address that security gap to allies in the Western Hemisphere and help stave off cartel control of key drug routes and ports, and in so doing help reduce the number of narcotics flowing into the United States.
Beyond unifying the global community in the fight against the global narcotics trade, shifting the focus of counternarcotics attention away from China via multilateral partnerships also puts pressure on China to join not only the United States but the larger international community in complying with counternarcotics efforts. In a testimony to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on National Security, Illicit Finance, and International Financial Institutions, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown suggested that in cooperating with allies, the United States also signals China to follow suit in cooperating in bilateral and multilateral counternarcotics operations. [20] As seen in China’s decision to sever U.S.-China counternarcotics efforts over Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, however, China’s decision to cooperate or not is largely based on geopolitical circumstances and U.S.-China relations. Nevertheless, the ICA could, at its best, serve as a rallying point for the United States and its allies against China.
Conclusion
If the larger international community cooperates on counternarcotics efforts, there will be a higher chance of reliable, long-term Chinese participation in these efforts. Furthermore, signaling to the world that the global narcotics trade is a transnational humanitarian crisis instead of a bilateral political issue will make it easier for the United States and China to work together. The United States can boost the credibility of this signaling by advancing a participatory agenda instead of a more domineering framework. Even without Beijing’s cooperation, the United States and the herein proposed ICA would be able to clamp down on narcotics production and shipping around the world. At its best, the coalition will slowly convince China that the production and distribution of narcotics should not be tactics in the geopolitical struggle against the United States but rather a collective humanitarian crisis that the world is coming together to solve.
Junwon “Junie” Park ’25 served as the President of the AHS chapter at the College of William and Mary, where he is majoring in Government and minoring in Data Science.
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Notes:
[1] “Provisional Drug Overdose Death Counts.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, December 13, 2023, www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/vsrr/drug-overdose-data.htm.
[2] “National Drug Control Strategy – 2022,” The White House – Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/National-Drug-Control-2022Strategy.pdf.
[3] “Fentanyl Flow to the United States,” Drug Enforcement Agency, January 2020, www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2020-03/DEA_GOV_DIR-008-20%20Fentanyl%20Flow%20in%20the%20United%20States_0.pdf.
[4] Dean Cheng, “China’s Taiwan Strategy after the Nancy Pelosi Visit: Forever Crisis?” The Heritage Foundation, August 22, 2022, www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/chinas-taiwan-strategy-after-the-nancy-pelosi-visit-forever-crisis.
[5] “Fentanyl Flow to the United States,” Drug Enforcement Agency.
[6] “Fentanyl Flow to the United States,” Drug Enforcement Agency.
[7] “Fentanyl Flow to the United States,” Drug Enforcement Agency.
[8] Ben Blanchard, “China Says Has Only ‘Limited’ Cooperation with U.S. on Fentanyl,” edited by Simon Cameron-Moore, Reuters, September 3, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-fentanyl/china-says-has-only-limited-cooperation-with-u-s-on-fentanyl-idUSKCN1VO0AD/.
[9] Ben Blanchard, “China Says Has Only ‘Limited’ Cooperation with U.S. on Fentanyl,” Reuters.
[10] Dean Cheng, “China’s Taiwan Strategy after the Nancy Pelosi Visit: Forever Crisis?”
[11] “Third U.S.-Colombia Counternarcotics Working Group (CNWG) Joint Statement,” U.S. Department of State, September 26, 2023.
[12] “National Drug Control Strategy – 2022,” The White House.
[13] “National Drug Control Strategy – 2022,” The White House
[14] Alexander Cheung, Joseph Marchand, and Patricia Mark, “Loss of Life and Labor Productivity: The Canadian Opioid Crisis,” University of Alberta, Department of Economics, February 2, 2020, https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/albaec/2020_013.html.
[15] Grant Peck and Jintamas Saksornchai, “UN Anti-Drug Agency Warns There Is No Let-up in Methamphetamine Trade from Asia’s Golden Triangle,” AP News, June 2, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/asia-golden-triangle-drugs-report-methamphetamine-e761e1acb0074f2286e65c752e276b61.
[16] “Third U.S.-Colombia Counternarcotics Working Group (CNWG) Joint Statement,” U.S. Department of State, September 26, 2023, https://www.state.gov/third-u-s-colombia-counternarcotics-working-group-cnwg-joint-statement/.
[17] “Justice Department Announces Eight Indictments against China-Based Chemical Manufacturing Companies and Employees,” Office of Public Affairs, United States Department of Justice, October 4, 2023, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-eight-indictments-against-china-based-chemical-manufacturing.
[18] U.S. Department of State, “Third U.S.-Colombia Counternarcotics Working Group (CNWG) Joint Statement.”
[19] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “China and Synthetic Drugs Control,” Brookings Institution, March 2022. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/FP_20221107_drug_trafficking_felbab_brown.pdf.
[20] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “China’s Role in the Fentanyl Crisis.” Brookings Institution, March 31, 2023, www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-role-in-the-fentanyl-crisis/.
Image: “COAST GUARD ISLAND, Alameda, Calif., – Petty Officer 3rd Class Eduard Ochoa, a port security specialist stationed at the Maritime Safety and Security Team 91105, stands guard over more than 40,000 pounds of cocaine worth an estimated $500 million being offloaded from the cutter Sherman upon its return here, April 23, 2007. The drugs were seized in three separate busts near Central America in February and March. The offload included approximately 38,000 pounds of cocaine seized in the largest cocaine bust in maritime history. U.S. Coast Guard Photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Mariana O’Leary” by Petty Officer 2nd Class Mariana O’Leary, retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USCoastGuardCocaineApr23.07.jpg. This image or file is a work of a United States Coast Guard service personnel or employee, taken or made as part of that person’s official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the image or file is in the public domain (17 U.S.C. § 101 and § 105, government, the image or file is in the public domain (17 U.S.C. § 101 and § 105, USCG main privacy policy and specific privacy policy for its imagery server).
